传统银行借贷、金融科技与中小企业融资  

Traditional Bank Lending, Fintech, and SME Financing

作　　者：金波 牛华伟[1] JIN Bo;NIU Huawei(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China;Law School,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学经济管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]南京大学法学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第3期169-176,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71871120);江苏省第十五批“六大人才高峰”高层次人才项目(SZCY-012);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2018SJZDI101)。

摘　　要：针对中小企业具有显著的现金流不确定和信息非对称的特征,本文基于连续时间合约理论建立一个理论模型,研究传统银行借贷与互联网金融两种方式下的最优贷款合约及其对中小企业融资影响的区别。模型推导发现:两种借贷方式下最优融资合约存在,均是企业家与债权人在私有收益与长期贷款激励下权衡的结果;最优贷款合约比市场贷款合约更能提高企业价值,且企业现金流的波动率越高,最优贷款利率越高、企业价值越低;两种借贷方式的最优贷款利率无实质差别,借助金融科技不会降低企业贷款的违约风险溢价,但能够降低融资边际成本;金融科技可以将企业信誉成本这一内生性资产作为类抵押资产,有效降低中小企业获得贷款的门槛,提高金融普惠性。此外,企业家应当面临适度的市场风险暴露以激励其尽职工作,从而提高借贷双方的期望总收益。The difficulty with financing and high cost of financing of small and median enterprises(SME),which have their significant characteristics of cash flow uncertainty and information asymmetry,is a serious challenge.However,the information asymmetry between the lending party and borrowing party always persists.Whatever the firm gets the funding through different lending methods,it essentially still falls under the debt financing way based on the principal-agent relationship.Prior studies show that new technologies such as big data and financial technology can help mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard issues resulting from information asymmetry to some extent.However,even with access to funding,the economic uncertainty could exacerbate the cash flow uncertainty of SME,leading to bankruptcy.Consequently,the refinancing behavior of SME may also be hindered.Therefore,exploring innovative lending methods and loan products through the development of financial technology to address issues such as insufficient collateral assets,high default risk,and severe information asymmetry faced by SME in financing,to meet their financing needs,remains a significant topic of continuous concern for scholars both domestically and internationally.This paper establishes a dynamic financial model based on the continuous-time contract theory,quantitatively studies the optimal loan contract that can mitigate the dynamic moral hazard faced by entrepreneurs and discusses the impact of the two lending methods on debt financing for SME and the difference between them.Specifically,the dynamic moral hazard refers to the situation where,after each period’s loan contract is signed and executed,due to the unverifiable and unobservable of the information about whether the entrepreneur exerts his effort,the entrepreneur may shirk to seek private gains.Moral hazard reduces the success probability of the invested project,leading to loan defaults.In case of default,the entrepreneur loses expected returns,and default loss is borne by the creditors.

关 键 词：金融科技 最优贷款合约 企业价值 道德风险 内生性资产 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学] F832.1