经营风险、预算约束与控制权分配——开发区经营模式的演变及其逻辑  

Navigating Operational Risks and Budgetary Constraints:The Evolution of Development Zones'Operational Models and Control Rights Allocation

作　　者：陈永杰 Chen Yongjie(School of Public Administration,Hangzhou Normal University,Hangzhou)

机构地区：[1]杭州师范大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2024年第2期130-139,共10页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学规划之江青年专项课题“城乡基层政权治理能力建设的浙江实践研究”(项目编号:24ZJQN108Y);国家社科基金青年项目“经济功能区与行政区间的治权冲突及协调机制研究”(项目编号:21CZZ032)。

摘　　要：地方政府的经营模式具有动态性、多样性和适应性特征。文章构建了一个经营风险、预算约束与控制权分配的分析框架,并借助案例研究解释开发区经营模式从市场外包到政企统合再到政企合作的演变。研究发现,这一演变是地方政府依据不同发展阶段的经营风险和预算约束等因素对控制权的相机分配。具体而言,从市场外包模式向政企统合模式的演变是地方政府转移控制权、进行纵向整合的过程,目的是解决市场企业与地方政府的经营冲突,降低经营风险。从政企统合模式向政企合作模式的演变,是地方政府在保留相机控制权的基础上向市场让渡部分权力、与市场合作的过程,目的是降低经营成本,缓解预算约束。控制经营风险,保障投引资目标是首要逻辑。在此前提下,地方政府通过相机调整控制权来降低经营成本、缓解预算约束。不同发展阶段、不同治理领域的风险、约束和成本的变量特征决定了行政与外包两种机制的组合配置,从而塑造了多样的经营或治理模式。Local government operational models display traits of dynamism,diversity,and adaptability.This study explores the evolutionary progression of operational models in development zones,transitioning from market outsourcing to government-enterprise cooperation,and eventually to government-enterprise collaboration.Specifically,the shift from market outsourcing to government-enterprise cooperation involves the transfer and consolidation of control rights by local governments to mitigate operational conflicts between enterprises and the government.Subsequently,the transition from government-enterprise cooperation to government-enterprise collaboration sees local governments maintaining strategic control rights while relinquishing some authority to the market and engaging in collaboration.Effectively managing operational risks and achieving investment attraction objectives remains paramount throughout these transitions.Within this framework,local governments are incentivized to judiciously adjust control rights to reduce operational costs and alleviate budgetary constraints.

关 键 词：控制权 市场外包 政企统合 政企合作 开发区 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济]