RCEP中日本市场准入例外安排的决定因素——基于政治经济学的分析框架  

The Determinants of Exceptional Arrangements of Japan's Market Access in RCEP:An Analytical Framework Based on Political Economy

作　　者：吕建兴 李孝忠[2] Lu Jian-xing;Li Xiao-zhong

机构地区：[1]广州大学经济与统计学院,广州510006 [2]东北农业大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150030

出　　处：《亚太经济》2024年第2期61-73,共13页Asia-Pacific Economic Review

摘　　要：区域全面经济伙伴关系协定(RCEP)是对近些年逆全球化、贸易保护主义的有力对冲,也是中日首个双边互惠安排。梳理日本在RCEP中产品层面的关税减让模式,并基于政治经济学的分析框架,利用线性概率模型实证分析日本将部分产品纳入关税减让例外安排的决定因素。研究发现:(1)事实特征上,在RCEP中日本对外开放程度不高,FTA生效后仅有63%的产品关税立即降为0,24%的产品关税减让过渡期超过10年,另有13%的产品完全不参与降税。(2)实证分析发现,面临贸易创造的且有组织的进口竞争性产品易于通过利益集团影响贸易政策制定,从而更可能被纳入关税减让的例外安排;而深度嵌入全球价值链(GVC)且资源和市场“两头在外”的生产贸易模式,使得GVC参与度越高的产品越不容易被纳入关税减让的例外安排;但是关税减让过渡期和完全例外安排的决策机制是不同的,面临贸易创造的利益集团只能获得关税减让超长过渡期的保护,而GVC参与度越高的产品能获得更低概率的关税减让完全例外安排。The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP)is a powerful hedge against anti-global-ization and trade protectionism in recent years,and it is also the reciprocal arrangement between China and Japan.Summarize Japan's tariff concession patterns at the product level in RCEP,and empirically analyze the determinants of Japan's inclusion of some products in the tariff concession exceptional arrangements by using linear probability models based on the analytical framework of political economy.The result shows that(1)on the factual characteristics,Japan's openness level to the world is not high in RCEP.After the FTA comes into force,only 63% of products'tariffs are re-duced to zero immediately,24%of products'tariff concession transition period is more than 10 years,and another 13% of products do not participate in tariff reductions at all.(2)In terms of empirical analysis,organized import-competitive products facing trade creation are easy to influence trade policymaking through interest groups,and thus are more likely to be included in the tariff concession exceptional arrangements;while the production and trade model deeply embed-ded in the GVC and with resources and markets"on both sides of the border"makes products with higher GVC par-ticipation less likely to be included in the tariff concession exceptional arrangements.However,the decision-making mechanisms for tariff reduction transition periods and completely exceptional arrangements are different.Interest groups facing trade creation can only receive protection from tariff reduction over a long transition periods,while products with higher GVC participation can obtain a lower probability of tariff reduction completely exceptional arrangements.These findings provide a solid scientific basis for reasonably grasping the principles of market access adherence and concession limits in future FTA negotiations between China and Japan.

关 键 词：市场准入 全球价值链 利益集团 保护策略 

分 类 号：F741.2[经济管理—国际贸易] F744[经济管理—产业经济]