A countermeasure designed to restrain self-serving behavior and strategic rating disclosure of credit rating agencies  

作　　者：Kittiphod Charoontham Jirawat Worakantak Kessara Kanchanapoom Nartraphee Tancho 

机构地区：[1]Faculty of Business Administration and Accountancy,Khon Kaen University,Khon Kaen,Thailand [2]Faculty of Management Science,Silpakorn University,Bangkok,Thailand [3]Faculty of Business Administration,Rajamangala University of Technology Thanyaburi,Pathumtani,Thailand

出　　处：《Journal of Management Analytics》2023年第3期550-565,共16页管理分析学报（英文）

摘　　要：This study examines an incentive of the credit rating agency(CRA)to exert effort to observe projects’signals and strategically disclose ratings when the upfront fee and performance-based fee scheme are imposed.Under the upfront fee scheme,the CRA obtains an upfront fee in exchange for its services but gains a performance-based fee only if its ratings accurately foresee the rated project’s outcome.In the setting,an issuer solicits a rating from the CRA,whose conduct of inflating and deflating ratings is considered.In addition,the CRA can endogenously exert effort to observe a project’s signal,which specifies the signal accuracy and how much operating costs the CRA incurs.After receiving the observed signal,the CRA can strategically decide to announce a rating corresponding to or contradicting the observed signal.The findings reveal that the performance-based fee scheme incentivizes the CRA to exert greater effort and truthfully disclose a more accurate rating.

关 键 词：Rating inflation policy rating deflation policy performance-based fee scheme upfront fee scheme voluntary disclosure 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]