Evolutionary game analysis of information service quality control of e-commerce platforms under information ecology  

作　　者：Xiaojun Xu Lu Wang Xiaoli Wang 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao,People’s Republic of China

出　　处：《Journal of Management Analytics》2024年第1期135-159,共25页管理分析学报（英文）

基　　金：the research support of National Social Science Fund Youth Project(CN)[grant number 19CTQ021].

摘　　要：Due to the information asymmetry and imperfect supervision system,the problem of information service quality of e-commerce platforms is becoming increasingly prominent.Based on the perspective of information ecology,this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model including merchants,e-commerce platforms and governments,and analyzes the dynamic process of the threeparty game under bounded rationality,thereby characterizing the behavior and optimal strategies of information service quality control.We carry out numerical simulation using data of the Pinduoduo platform.The results show that the cost of each party,control strength of e-commerce platforms,proportion of margin deducted and other factors are important factors affecting the quality of information service;Only when the sum of the costs of passive management of e-commerce platforms,penalties for merchants,and the additional revenue generated from the active management exceeds the cost of the active management of the e-commerce platforms,it ensures effective control over the quality of information service in a stable market environment.Finally,some suggestions are put forward to optimize the e-commerce information service quality control.

关 键 词：E-commerce platforms information service quality control evolutionary game information ecology 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济]