风险制造与风险规避:基层政府的行为逻辑  

Risk Creation and Risk Avoidance:Behavioral Logic of Grassroots Government

作　　者：陈文琼 CHEN Wen-qiong(School of Public Administration,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学公共管理学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第3期132-140,共9页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(21CSH012)。

摘　　要：通过对Z省S县和H省X县的田野调查,发现基层政府存在一定的制造风险的行为,主要表现为逾越上级政府对其行为所设定的规范或要求,其背后的动机往往是为了增加财政可支配收入或扩大对基层有限财政的支配权,从而缓解财政供需之间的矛盾;该行为生成于县域财政资金匮乏与横向竞争结构下政绩压力的双重挤压,由于“资源密集型”政绩的路径依赖,政府产生了大量的财政资源诉求,然而这种需求却难以通过当前匮乏的财政资源得到满足;为了将制造的风险限定在可控的范围之内,迎检、维稳和精英俘获都是基层转而采取的风险规避行为策略。The field research in S county Z province,and X county H province,found that the risk-producing behaviour of grass-roots governments mainly manifested itself in the form of exceeding top-down regulations/requirements governing the behaviour of grass-roots governments,aiming at increasing disposable financial revenue or increasing their control over limited grass-roots finances in order to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand faced by the governments.This behavior is generated by the dual pressure of fiscal scarcity in the county and the pressure of performance under the horizontal competition structure.Due to the path dependence on″resource-intensive″performance,the government has generated a large number of demands for financial resources,which are difficult to satisfy through the current scarcity of financial resources.In order to control the risks to a manageable level,the grassroots have turned to risk-avoidance behavioral strategies such as welcoming inspections,maintaining stability,and capturing elites.

关 键 词：风险制造 风险规避 财政收入 “资源密集型”政绩 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]