政府监管下快递企业与加盟商利益协调研究  

Research on the Coordination of Interests between Express Enterprises and Franchisees under Government Regulation

作　　者：孙军艳[1] 孙佳豪 王子豪 SUN Jun-yan;SUN Jia-hao;WANG Zi-hao(College of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering,Shaanxi University of Science&Technology,Xi'an 710021,China)

机构地区：[1]陕西科技大学机电工程学院,陕西西安710021

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2024年第5期91-98,共8页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：加盟制作为一种常用的商业模式使快递企业得以快速扩张。文中构建快递企业、加盟商和政府部门三方演化博弈模型,通过稳定性分析得到7个均衡点和对应的稳定性条件。通过数值仿真分析三方演化博弈理想策略的演化路径,阐明快递企业、加盟商和政府部门演化的内在机理。通过分析利益分配、风险分担对快递企业和加盟商双方演化博弈的影响,结果表明:对快递企业而言,快递企业向监管策略演化的速率与收取加盟商收益的比例成正比,与分担风险的比例成反比;对加盟商而言,加盟商向提供高质量服务策略演化的速率与加盟商减去快递企业监管收取的比例成正比,与分担风险的比例成反比。最后研究政府行为对三方演化博弈的影响,结果表明,政府部门的奖励强度与金额的增加以及高强度管理可加快快递企业向监管策略演化,同时也能促进加盟商向提供高质量服务策略演化。Franchise as a commonly used business model enables the rapid expansion of express enterprises.This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of express enterprises,franchisees and government departments,and obtains seven equilibrium points and corresponding stability conditions through stability analysis.Through numerical simulation,the evolution path of the ideal strategy of the three-party evolution ary game is analyzed,and the internal mechanism of the evolution of express enterprises,franchisees and government departments is elucidated.By analyzing the impact of benefit distribution and risk sharing on the evolutionary game of express enterprises and franchisees,the results show that:for express enterprises,the rate of evolution of express enterprises to the regulatory strategy is directly proportional to the proportion of franchisees revenue,and inversely proportional to the proportion of the risk sharing;for franchisees,the rate of evolution of franchisees strategy of providing high-quality services is directly proportional to the proportion of franchisees minus that charged by express enterprise regulation,and inversely proportional to the proportion of risk sharing.Finally,the government s behavior on the impact of the three-party evolutionary game is studied,and the results show that the increase in the intensity and amount of incentives,and the high-intensity management of the government department can accelerate the evolution of express enterprises to the regulatory strategy,and meanwhile promote the evolution of franchisees to the strategy of providing high-quality services.

关 键 词：快递企业 利益分配 风险分担 演化博弈 稳定性分析 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]