碳税与碳交易机制下基于演化博弈模型的钢铁企业碳减排投资决策分析  

Analysis of carbon emission reduction investment decision of steel enterprises based on evolutionary game model under carbon tax and carbon trading mechanism

作　　者：玄婉玥 朱昱承 丁日佳[1] 翟建桥 王科[2] XUAN Wanyue;ZHU Yucheng;DING Rijia;ZHAI Jianqiao;WANG Ke(School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology-Beijing,Beijing 100083,China;School of Management and Economics,Bejing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学(北京)管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《煤炭经济研究》2024年第3期73-81,共9页Coal Economic Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(23ZDA107)。

摘　　要：碳税和碳交易作为政府调控碳减排目标的主要措施之一,会对钢铁企业的碳减排投资决策产生重要影响。构建钢铁企业碳减排投资决策的演化博弈模型,并分别探讨在碳税和碳交易机制下企业碳减排投资策略。结果表明,碳减排投资的效率和成本以及搭便车收益对于钢铁企业的策略选择有重要影响;碳税和碳交易机制均能通过碳定价的方式降低搭便车行为的概率,促进钢铁企业协同减排,但二者对于企业收益的影响存在差别。Carbon taxation and carbon trading,as the government's primary measures to regulate carbon emission targets,will also significantly influence the carbon emission investment decisions of steel enterprises.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for the carbon emission investment decisions of steel enterprises and explores the investment strategies for carbon emission reduction by enterprises under carbon taxation and carbon trading mechanisms.The results indicate that the efficiency and cost of carbon emission reduction investment,as well as free-rider benefits,significantly influence the strategic choices of steel enterprises.Both carbon taxation and carbon trading can reduce the probability of free-riding through carbon pricing,promoting coordinated emissions reduction by steel enterprises,but their effects on corporate profits differ.

关 键 词：钢铁企业 碳减排投资 演化博弈 碳交易 碳税 

分 类 号：F416.21[经济管理—产业经济]