高校扩招、学历回报与高考复读——基于复读博弈模型的理论与实证  

College Enrollment Expansion,Educational Return,and Retake of the National College Entrance Examination——Theory and Empirical Research Based on the“Retaking Game”

作　　者：王湛[1] 郑智文 王帝 Wang Zhan;Zheng Zhiwen;Wang Di

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国西部经济研究院 [2]西南财经大学中国行为经济与行为金融研究中心

出　　处：《财经科学》2024年第4期92-107,共16页Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目:骨髓移植动态交换机制理论与仿真实验研究(72001177);国家自然科学基金重点项目:市场设计的计算机仿真模拟实践研究(72033003)的资助。

摘　　要：本文通过建立复读博弈模型进行理论分析,发现明确的高校学历信号差异会导致考生付出一定成本,选择复读提高考试能力以获得更高的学历。一旦出现复读,在动态演化后,复读人数和高考难度最终会达到一个比较高的稳定水平。而高校扩招会通过扩大高校间信号收益的差距进一步提高这个稳定水平,其中学历信号相对低的高校扩招导致复读增加的效应更加明显。实证结果表明,高校扩招使得大学专科和本科学历的信号收益显著降低,且前者降低更多。复读率受4年前的高校扩招的影响最大,4年前高校每扩招1%,复读率就会上升0.09%左右。这些实证结果与理论结论一致。We analyze the impact of college enrollment expansion on the retake of the National College Entrance Examination(NCEE)by theoretical model and empirical data.In the retake game,we showed that differences in the value of college education sig⁃nals can incentivize candidates to spend an extra year of study and retake the NCEE for higher education signals.In the process of dynamic evolution,the number of candidates choosing to retake and the difficulty of the NCEE will eventually reach a relatively high equilibrium.The college enrollment expansion will raise the equilibrium to a higher level,and the effect of expansion is more signifi⁃cant in relatively low-level colleges.With empirical analysis,we showed that the rate of retake is mostly affected by the expansion of college enrollment 4 years ago.Expansion in earlier years also increases the rate,but the effect decreases as the years go further back.In addition,compared to high-level colleges,low-level colleges had enrollment expansion of a larger scale,which increased the gap in the value of education signals between the two types colleges,making it more profitable to get admitted to a better college through retaking of the NCEE.

关 键 词：高考复读 高校扩招 信号博弈 

分 类 号：G640[文化科学—高等教育学]