生态补偿视角下流域跨界水污染协同治理机制设计及演化博弈分析  

Mechanism design and evolutionary game analysis of collaborative transboundary water pollution control in the basin from the perspective of ecological compensation

作　　者：杨霞[1,2] 何刚 吴传良[2,3] 张世玉 YANG Xia;HE Gang;WU Chuanliang;ZHAHG Shiyu(School of Economics and Management,Anhui University of Science&Technology,Huainan 232001,Anhui,China;School of Economics and Management,Huainan Normal University,Huainan 232038,Anhui,China;College of Business,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232001 [2]淮南师范学院经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232038 [3]上海财经大学商学院,上海200433

出　　处：《安全与环境学报》2024年第5期2033-2042,共10页Journal of Safety and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72271005);教育部人文社科规划基金项目(22YJAZH025);2021年度安徽高校人文社会科学研究项目(SK2021A0543)。

摘　　要：针对流域相邻两地区和流域管理机构三方博弈主体,引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制,构建流域跨界水污染三方演化博弈理论模型。通过稳定性分析得出流域跨界水污染协同治理理想状态的稳定条件,并结合新安江流域生态补偿试点案例进行仿真分析。结果表明:(1)引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制可有效推动新安江流域相邻两地采取达标排放行为,促使系统达到(1, 1, 0)稳定状态;(2)动态奖惩机制组合使用有助于系统演化,从博弈主体初始意愿、实施效能和支持倾向等角度综合考虑,动态奖励-静态惩罚策略监管效果最优,动态奖励-动态惩罚策略次之;(3)流域跨界水污染协同治理的实现策略与相邻两地达标排放的治理成本与收益、双向生态补偿金额度、流域管理机构发放生态补偿奖励金额、积极监管成本和收益等因素密切相关。This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game theoretical model of transboundary water pollution in the basin,where the three-game subjects involved are the two neighboring regions of the basin and the basin management agency.This model aims to achieve collaborative management of water pollution in the basin,alleviate water pollution in the basin,and promote ecological restoration.First,a two-way ecological compensation-reward and punishment mechanism is introduced.Secondly,the stability conditions for the most ideal state of transboundary water pollution collaborative management in the basin are derived through the stability analysis method and simulated with an actual case,which is a pilot case of water pollution management and ecological compensation in Huangshan City and Hangzhou City of Xin an River Basin.Results show that first of all the introduction of a two-way ecological compensation-reward and punishment mechanism can effectively promote the two neighboring areas of the Xin an River basin to adopt the standard discharge behavior and promote the system to reach the(1,1,0)steady state.The result confirms the application value of the designed tripartite evolutionary game model of transboundary water pollution in the basin.Moreover,it is found that the combination of dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms helps the system evolve.From the perspective of the initial willingness,implementation effectiveness,and support propensity of the game subjects,dynamic reward and static punishment strategies are optimally regulated,with dynamic reward and dynamic punishment strategies following closely behind.Besides,it is important to note that the realization strategy of transboundary water pollution synergistic management in the basin is closely related to the cost and benefit of treatment of the two neighboring places to meet the standard discharge,the amount of two-way ecological compensation,the amount of ecological compensation rewards issued by the basin management agencies,and the cost and benefit of a

关 键 词：环境学 水污染 演化博弈 生态补偿 动态奖惩 协同治理 

分 类 号：X522[环境科学与工程—环境工程]