论超级平台扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制  

Anti-monopoly Regulation of Super Platform Killer Acquisitions

作　　者：曹锦秋[1] 赵子谋 CAO Jinqiu;ZHAO Zimou(Law School of Liaoning University,Shenyang 110036,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学法学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第2期81-88,共8页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“系统性金融风险法律治理中的监管职能配置研究”(19CFX024)。

摘　　要：超级平台扼杀式并购是平台商业模式下具有或可能具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中的一种特殊情况。现行反垄断规范发端并适配于实体经济,面对超级平台扼杀式并购的规制困境可主要归结为事前申报中标准涵盖局限、实体审查中违法性判断受干扰、包容审慎原则的适用缺乏制度环境等原因。欲有效规制,需要通过适用切合平台模式的复合型指标、落实主动调查制度与标准实施评估制度,构建综合性申报体系;通过直接证据法的类型化及其分层适用、识别潜在竞争者的裁量基准的设定、限制性条件的设定,排除实体审查的障碍;通过回应性监管模式的构建及其附随的制度安排,更好地贯彻包容审慎原则。The killer acquisition of super platforms is a special case of business concentration under the platform business model that has or may have the effect of excluding and restricting competition effects.The current antitrust norms originate and adapt to the real economy.The regulatory dilemma facing the killer acquisition of super platforms can be mainly attributed to the limited scope of standards in pre-declaration,the interference of the illegality determination in the substantive review,and the lack of institutional environment for the application of the principle of inclusive prudence.To effectively regulate,it is necessary to apply compound indicators that fit the platform model,implement more proactive investigation systems and standard implementation evaluation systems,and build a comprehensive declaration system;eliminate the obstacles of substantive review through the typification and layered application of direct evidence law,the setting of discretionary benchmarks for identifying potential competitors,and the setting of restrictive conditions,and better implement the principle of inclusive prudence through the construction of responsive regulatory models and their accompanying institutional arrangements.

关 键 词：平台垄断 扼杀式并购 反垄断法 包容审慎原则 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]