身份转化、利益竞争与集体资产分配政策演化——“利益-规范”双重博弈的视角  

Status Transformation,Interest Competition and Evolution of Collective Assets Rights Distribution Policy:A Perspective of Dual Game of Interest and Norms

作　　者：金文龙 Jin Wenlong

机构地区：[1]安徽大学社会与政治学院,合肥230601

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（农业经济研究）》2023年第2期150-160,共11页AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

基　　金：安徽大学博士科研启动经费项目“城郊农村集体资产权界定中的身份竞争及其对策研究”(Y040451001);安徽大学社会学学科建设青年教师科研创新项目“多边契约与基层风险共同体的形塑——对村级集体经济发展模式的考察”(SZJSKYCX2022011)。

摘　　要：集体资产股份合作制改革的关键是确定集体成员边界。在“利益-规范”双重博弈的视角下,分析N村集体资产分配的身份利益体系演化过程,发现集体成员权纠纷是以身份为基础的利益博弈过程。与纯粹的利益博弈不同,以身份为基础的利益博弈表现为“利益-规范”双重博弈,行动者既需要在利益层面达成博弈均衡,又需要在社会规范层面达成博弈均衡。在“利益-规范”双重博弈过程中,行动者试图在利益的基础上引入对自己更有利的社会规范,以约束其他参与者的策略选择,提高自身博弈地位。这也决定了“利益-规范”双重博弈均衡具有不稳定性的特征。集体资产分配中的身份利益体系演化正是“利益-规范”双重博弈均衡动态演化的过程。The key to reforming collectively-owned rural assets based on a shareholding cooperative system is to determine the boundaries of collective members.From the perspective of interest-norm game,the evolution process of the status rights system of collective asset distribution in N Village is analyzed.It is found that the collective membership disputes are interest competitions caused by status,and are a process of interest games based on status.Different from the pure interest game,the interest game based on status is manifested as a dual game of interests and norms,and the actors not only need to achieve a game equilibrium at the interest level,but also achieve a game equilibrium at the social norms level.In the process of the dual game of interests and norms,actors try to introduce more favorable social norms on the basis of interests to constrain the strategic choices of other participants and improve their own game status,which also determines the characteristics of inherent instability in the interest-norm game equilibrium.The evolution of the identity rights system in the distribution of collective assets is the dynamic evolution of the interest-normative dual game equilibrium.

关 键 词：身份转化 利益竞争 集体资产 “利益-规范”双重博弈 

分 类 号：F321.32[经济管理—产业经济]