终极所有权结构与企业委托贷款行为  

Ultimate Ownership Structure and Entrusted Loan Behavior of Enterprises

作　　者：王晓燕 杨胜刚 张科坤 Wang Xiaoyan;Yang Shenggang;Zhang Kekun(College of Economics and Management,Henan Agricultural University,Zhengzhou 450046,China;School of Business Administration,Hunan University,Changsha 410082,China;School of Finance and Statistics,Hunan University,Changsha 410006,China)

机构地区：[1]河南农业大学经济与管理学院,河南郑州450046 [2]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082 [3]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410006

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第4期48-57,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目(2023M741060);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71850006);国家社会科学基金项目(19ZDA103)。

摘　　要：本文采用手工搜集2006-2016年中国A股上市公司从事委托贷款业务数据,考察终极所有权结构对企业委托贷款行为的影响。研究发现,不同的所有权结构对企业委托贷款行为影响存在差异:现金流权显著抑制基于侵占动机的委托贷款行为,控制权和现金流权的分离显著促进基于侵占动机的委托贷款行为。进一步研究发现,现金流权和两权分离的不同影响均显著体现在关联方委托贷款;企业的国有性质弱化现金流权和两权分离对企业委托贷款行为的显著影响。本研究为全面认识所有权结构的影响后果提供了新的证据,也为理解企业委托贷款行为的影响因素提供了启示。As China's economy steps into the"new normal",structural problems caused by economic growth have become prominent one of the important problems,"Moving from real to virtual"attracting extensive atten-tion from the business and academic.In particular,entrusted loan transaction develops rapidly and has become an important part of the social financing system.A large number of entity enterprises engage in financial activi-ties and allocate their own funds to entrusted loan transaction,which has gradually become an important feature of capital allocation behavior of entity enterprises in China.In this context,it is very important to clarify the influencing factors of entrusted loans for the normative development of corporate governance.Using manually collected dataset of entrusted loans of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2016 in China,the effect of ultimate ownership structure on entrusted loan behavior of enterprises is examined.Our results show that differ-ent structures of ultimate shareholder ownership have different effects on enterprises engaged in entrusted loans.Cash flow right significantly decreases the behavior of entrusted loans with the tunneling motivation.The divergence between control right and cash flow right significantly increases the behavior of entrusted loans with tunneling motivation.Furthermore,the different effects of cash flow right and control-ownership wedge are significantly reflected in affiliated entrusted loans.State-owned property of enterprises weakens the significant effect of cash flow right and control-ownership wedge on entrusted loan behavior.New evidence is provided for a comprehensive understanding of the economic consequences of ownership structure,and enlightenment is also provided for understanding the influencing factors of enterprise entrusted loan behavior in this paper.

关 键 词：终极控股股东 现金流权 两权分离 委托贷款 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]