消费者偏好信息不对称下合同制造商高质量入侵策略研究  

Research on High Quality Encroachment Strategy of Contract Manufacturers under Asymmetric Information of Consumer Preference

作　　者：闵杰 徐小禹 欧剑 曹宗宏 MIN Jie;XU Xiaoyu;OU Jian;CAO Zonghong(School of Mathematics and Physics,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽建筑大学数理学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第4期218-225,I0082-I0086,共13页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72271004);安徽省学术和技术带头人及后备人选科研活动经费资助项目(2018H183);安徽省高校省级人文社会科学研究项目(SK2020A0277);安徽省高校自然科学研究项目(KJ2021JD13)。

摘　　要：考虑由一个合同制造商(Contract Manufacturer, CM)和一个原始设备制造商(Original Equipment Manufacturer, OEM)组成的二级供应链,CM在为OEM代工的同时,也引入自己的品牌与OEM竞争。在OEM能够获取消费者质量偏好信息的前提下,分析不同信息结构和CM高质量入侵行为对供应链成员定价决策的影响。研究发现,(1)CM入侵总是对自身有利,而对OEM不利。(2)信息不对称始终损害CM的利益,但只有在CM入侵且高低偏好市场之间的差异较大时才损害OEM的利润。(3)若真实市场偏好较高,且不掌握信息的CM对市场信心较弱,则OEM产品的定价能使所有消费者的需求都得到满足。(4)提高代工产品的质量在CM不入侵或者信息对称下对CM有利,而其余情况下是否有利与CM销售成本有关。进一步讨论了消费者偏好信息的作用,发现多数情况下OEM不获取消费者信息对自身更有利。In the past decades,many Contract Manufacturers(CMs)manufactured products for Original Equipment Manufacturers(OEMs).Since CMs have mastered the knowledge and technology of OEMs in the production process,they have the ability to develop products by themselves.Therefore,many CMs encroach the market by establishing their own brands,which are called private brands.Most of the previous studies have assumed the quality of encroached products to be lower than that of OEM’s products.However,in reality,there are quite a few CMs that encroach the market with high quality products.In addition,since manufacturer encroachment is affected by supply chain information structure,some researches have studied the encroachment problem under the combination of information asymmetry and quality factors.They can be roughly divided into two aspects:one is the information asymmetry between consumers and enterprises about product quality level;the other is the information asymmetry between enterprises about market demand.However,they do not consider the information asymmetry of consumers’quality preference.Based on the above background,this paper designs a two-level supply chain consisting of a CM and an OEM,in which a CM not only provides the OEM services,but also may introduce high-quality private products to compete with an OEM.Simultaneously,because the OEM has a better understanding of consumers,this paper also constructs an information asymmetry model of consumer quality preference.That is,heterogeneous consumers have different quality preferences for the same product,in which the OEM can obtain the specific distribution of consumer quality preference and know whether consumers prefer high quality or low quality overall.The CM only knows the probability of high or low distribution of consumer quality preference.In addition,since the CM can infer the true preference information by observing the OEM pricing,there is a signal game between the two sides.Based on this,we analyze the influences of different information structures and

关 键 词：合同制造商入侵 消费者偏好 信息不对称 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F247[经济管理—劳动经济]