人工智能主体地位之否定及其法理刍议  

Denial of the Subject Status for the AI Product and the Legal Theory Behind It

作　　者：梅智超 金晓红 MEI Zhichao;JIN Xiaohong(Jingdezhen Ceramic University,Jingdezhen 333403,Jiangxi,China;Jingdezhen University,Jingdezhen 333400,Jiangxi,China)

机构地区：[1]景德镇陶瓷大学,江西景德镇333403 [2]景德镇学院,江西景德镇333400

出　　处：《景德镇学院学报》2024年第2期69-74,共6页Journal of JingDeZhen University

摘　　要：在主体—客体二分模式的基本框架下,法律制度的构建与运行皆是以“人”为中心。人工智能作为人造物,其本质属性在于工具性。虽然,在客观上人工智能拥有近乎甚至超越人脑存在的智能系统,但这并不能代表其已经具备“人”的独立意识和理性思维,没有为自己立法的现实可能性,无法取得类似于自然人的主体地位,而法人拟制主体的取得,看似为赋予人工智能以主体地位,提供了现实可行性。但人工智能与法人主体构成的实体性要素和价值性要素的不适配性,决定了其也无法取得类似于法人的拟制主体地位。究其实质,作为人类社会的手段工具,人工智能应当作为法律关系中的客体,予以对待。Under the framework of the subject-object dichotomy model,the construction and operation of legal system are people-centered.The essential attribute of AI products,being artifacts after all,lies in their instrumentality.Although objectively AI product has intelligent system that is close to or even more sophisticated than human brain,this does not mean that it has the independent-to-be awareness and rational thinking ability that is unique to humans.So there is no realistic conditions for them to legislate for themselves,and it is impossible for them to achieve the subject status similar to that of the natural human being.The current achievements in subject status pursuing for the AI product seems to provide practical feasibility for giving the AI product such position.However,the incompatibility between the AI and the legal person in the substantive and value elements determines that the AI product cannot obtain the subject position of legislator like the legal person,because as a tool of human society in essence,AI product should be treated as the object when dealing with legal relations.

关 键 词：人工智能 主体资格 独立责任 意志能力 

分 类 号：D913[政治法律—民商法学]