信息不充分与我国育儿嫂市场失灵  

Insufficient Information and the Failure of China's Childcare Sister-in-law Market

作　　者：黄敬宝 HUANG Jingbao

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学经济学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2024年第1期102-107,共6页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“职业生涯视角下的大学毕业生就业质量研究”(14BSH068)。

摘　　要：我国育儿嫂市场失灵主要表现为育儿嫂的供求缺口较大、供给质量较差、雇佣关系不稳定。育儿嫂的原始信息不真实、不充分,育儿嫂公司没能发挥减震器的作用,婴幼儿父母收集、辨别育儿嫂信息的能力有限,信息不充分就直接作用于育儿嫂市场并导致市场失灵,包括通过交易成本降低匹配效率、通过逆向选择减少供给数量、通过道德风险降低服务质量。政府应通过市场管制,将公司由中介制转为员工制、强化专业技能证书的含金量、加强育儿嫂信息平台建设,增强信息的透明度,恢复市场机制的应有作用。The main manifestations of the failure of the childcare sister-in-law market in China are the large supply and demand gap,poor supply quality,and unstable employment relationships.The original information of caregivers is untrue and insufficient,and caregiver companies have not been able to play the role of shock absorbers,and the ability of parents of infants and young children to collect and distinguish caregiver information is limited.Insufficient information directly affects the caregiver market and leads to market failure,including reducing matching efficiency through transaction costs,reducing supply quantity through reverse selection,and reducing service quality through moral hazard.The government should regulate the market,shift companies from an intermediary system to an employee system,enhance the value of professional skills certificates,strengthen the construction of parenting information platforms,enhance information transparency,and restore the proper role of market mechanisms.

关 键 词：育儿嫂 市场失灵 信息不充分 零散行业 市场管制 

分 类 号：F719.9[经济管理—产业经济]