价值医疗视角下药品集团采购供应链药品质量监管策略研究  

Study on the Pharmaceutical Quality Supervision Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Group Purchasing Supply Chain From the Perspective of Value-Based Healthcare

作　　者：马志强[1] 冉波 李钊[1] Ma Zhiqiang(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2024年第5期539-545,共7页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“面向价值医疗的药品集团采购供应链成员合作激励机制研究”(72274082);国家自然科学基金项目“全科医生胜任力与居民签约服务利用意愿的耦合机制及提升策略研究”(71974082);国家自然青年科学基金项目“药品集团采购组织的服务价值实现机理与提升策略研究”(71804062)。

摘　　要：药品集团采购供应链的药品质量与价值医疗的实践紧密相关,然而近年来各类药品质量事故频发,药品集团采购供应链的药品质量监管策略亟需完善和健全。文章构建了药品生产企业、药品集团采购组织和医疗机构的三方演化博弈模型,利用Matlab R2018a软件仿真了不同情形下博弈主体的策略变化,并且为优化药品质量监管机制提供了建议。当药品生产企业、药品集团采购组织以及医疗机构的质量监管成本较低时,更倾向于参与药品集采供应链的药品质量监管。同时,三方主体策略选择的倾向还与初始意愿有关,初始意愿越大博弈系统可以更快地收敛到稳定点,但初始意愿只能改变演化的速率,对最终的演化稳定状态没有影响。此外,提升药品集团采购组织监管惩罚力度、提高医疗机构的索赔等措施也能够促进博弈主体参与药品质量监管。Value-based healthcare is directly related to the quality of pharmaceuticals in the pharmaceutical group purchasing supply chain.However,a number of pharmaceutical quality incidents have happened more frequently recently,which means that it is necessary to improve and refine the pharmaceutical quality supervision strategy of the pharmaceutical group procurement supply chain.A tripartite evolutionary game model for pharmaceutical producers,pharmaceutical group purchasing organizations and medical institutions was constructed,which can simulate how participants would alter their strategies in various scenarios by using Matlab R2018a software,and put forward suggestions for improving the pharmaceutical quality supervision mechanism.The lower the quality supervision cost of pharmaceutical producers,pharmaceutical group purchasing organizations and medical institutions,the more likely they are to take part in the pharmaceutical quality supervision of the pharmaceutical group procurement supply.In addition,the initial willingness has an impact on the tripartite players'propensity to select tactics.Although the initial willingness can only alter the rate of development and has no bearing on the ultimate evolutionary stable state,the higher the initial willingness,the faster the game system converges to the stable point.Moreover,actions like enhancing the oversight and sanctions of pharmaceutical group procurement organizations and bolstering the medical institutions'claims can encourage game participants to take part in pharmaceutical quality supervision.

关 键 词：价值医疗 药品集团采购供应链 药品质量监管 三方演化博弈 

分 类 号：R19[医药卫生—卫生事业管理] F224.32[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学]