基于动态诚信因子的主从博弈抑制微电网虚假信息交易研究  

Research on suppressing false information in micro-grid transactions with Stackelberg game based on dynamic integrity factor

作　　者：张莹 王敬华[1] 陈文钢[1] 陈佳佳[1] 徐丙垠[1] 尹文良 Zhang Ying;Wang Jinghua;Chen Wengang;Chen Jiajia;Xu Bingyin;Yin Wenliang(Shandong University of Technology,Zibo 255000,China)

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学,山东淄博255000

出　　处：《可再生能源》2024年第6期827-835,共9页Renewable Energy Resources

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(52005306)。

摘　　要：为了解决微电网群内交互信息中存在的虚假信息问题,在考虑微电网(Microgrid,MG)诚信行为的基础上,文章提出了一种基于动态诚信因子的主从博弈电能交易机制。首先,以MG上报电量与实际交易电量为基准,建立奖惩机制,通过动态调整诚信因子来调节交易电价。其次,构建了一个以微电网群运营商(Microgrid Cluster Operator,MGCO)为领导、MG为跟随者的主从博弈模型。上层模型以最小化微电网群整体功率波动为目标,通过建立交易定价的合约机制,有针对性地调节群内交易电价;下层模型以MG运行费用最小为目标,根据群内交易电价动态调整自身购售电需求量,实现电能优化。最后,通过算例分析验证了该交易机制能够有效抑制微电网群内人为上报虚假信息的行为。In order to suppress the false information existing in the interactive information between microgrid(MG) and microgrid cluster operator(MGCO),a trading mechanism with the Stackelberg game is proposed,and a dynamic integrity factor is used to consider the honesty behavior of the MG.Firstly,a reward and punishment mechanism based on the reported electricity quantity and the actual trading quantity is established.Transaction price can be adjusted by credit factor.Secondly,a Stackelberg game model with MGCO as leader and MGs as followers is developed.The upper level minimizes fluctuation of power for microgrid cluster,where a contract mechanism of transaction is established to adjust basic transaction prices within the cluster.In the lower level,the cost of MG operation is minimized.Each MG acts as the follower responding to the day-ahead trading price and decides the electricity of exchange power with MGCO.Finally,the study prove that the presented transaction mechanism effectively suppresses the false information.

关 键 词：微电网群 虚假信息 双层优化 主从博弈 奖惩机制 

分 类 号：TK51[动力工程及工程热物理—热能工程] TK89[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] TM73