党建融合银行治理的风险防范效应  

Party Leadership,Banking Governance and Risk Taking

作　　者：段月姣 刘冲[2] 李欣明 Yuejiao Duan;Chong Liu;Xinming Li(School of Finance,Nankai University;School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融学院 [2]上海财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《经济管理学刊》2024年第2期243-266,共24页Quarterly Journal of Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72203115、72103106);教育部人文社科青年项目(21YJC790067);南开大学文科发展基金项目(ZX20220073)对本文研究的资助。

摘　　要：随着党委成员进入公司董监高的法定程序与机制不断完善,“双向进入、交叉任职”体制促进“党组治理”与“现代公司治理”有机融合,形成双重治理架构。基于2002—2020年215家商业银行的面板数据,本文探究了党组参与银行治理的风险防范效应,并从党委书记和董事长“两职合一”到党委成员进入董监高等多个维度进行实证检验,研究发现:党组参与治理显著降低了银行的风险承担。进一步地,面对经济政策不确定性上升所带来的负面影响,党组参与治理主要通过班子成员进入董事会来有效降低银行风险承担,提高金融体系韧性。具体通过降低大客户集中度、熨平经营波动性来实现,而非紧缩贷款、囤积流动性。因此,党建与银行治理的融合有效地提升了金融服务实体的能力。本文检验了党组参与银行治理的作用机制与风险防范效应,丰富了中国特色金融企业制度的理论创新与实践探索。The key to sustainable growth in banking lies in the Communist Party of China s(CPC)leadership and the refinement of internal governance mechanisms.Effectively preventing financial risks will significantly propel the banking sector towards high-quality development.Hence,it is crucial to actively explore how organizations of the CPC can engage in the governance structure of banks,and establish a governance model tailored to China s unique characteristics.Commercial banks face substantial information asymmetry and high regulatory costs,making refined internal governance mechanisms pivotal for risk management within these institutions.As the statutory procedures and mechanisms for CPC committee members to join corporate boards and senior management continue to improve,a“two-way entry and cross-serving”model emerges,forming a dual governance framework that blends“CPC-led governance”with“modern corporate governance”.This paper summarizes the involvement of CPC organizations in the governance of 215 commercial banks from 2002 to 2020.In the context of economic policy uncertainty,this paper examines how the integration of CPC into governance through“two-way entry and cross-serving”affects risk prevention in banks.The findings suggest:Firstly,CPC s involvement significantly reduces banks risk exposure by mitigating the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty.Particularly,when the CPC committee s Secretary concurrently serves as the Chairman,this combination has a more pronounced impact on reducing bank risk compared to CPC committee members in supervisory and managerial roles.Secondly,CPC s“Three Importance and One Greatness”system,covering major issues,important appointments and removals,major projects,and the use of large amounts of money,displays proactive risk prevention features.Thus,during increased economic policy uncertainty,banks with CPC involvement in governance mitigate operational volatility,reducing risk exposure.This is evident in banks avoiding excessive liquidity hoarding and d

关 键 词：党组参与银行治理 经济政策不确定性 银行风险承担 金融体系韧性 

分 类 号：D26[政治法律—政治学] F83[政治法律—中共党史]