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作 者:陈晔婷 宋语嫣 朱锐[2] 何思源 Yeting Chen;Yuyan Song;Rui Zhu;Siyuan He(School of Economics and Management,Yunnan Normal University;School of Software,Yunnan University)
机构地区:[1]云南师范大学经济与管理学院 [2]云南大学软件学院
出 处:《经济管理学刊》2024年第2期267-290,共24页Quarterly Journal of Economics and Management
摘 要:本文基于利益分配视角,构建大数据联盟、大数据联盟成员与政府相关部门的三方演化博弈模型,并对各主体决策影响数据有效共享进行了理论分析。研究结果表明:①虽然伴随着数据价值潜在收益的提高,大数据联盟泄露数据信息攫取高额利润的概率增大,但政府采取保证金利益分配的监管方式仍具备一定的治理效能。②大数据联盟决策很难受到声誉等社会收益或损失的影响,社会层面的多元共治对其博弈策略选择缺乏影响力。③大数据联盟成员对保证金制度敏感性较高,此举措作为数据治理补偿可以有效缓解大数据联盟成员搭便车现象的出现,但政府在评估治理措施改善数据市场的同时也需要考量保证金的收益分配是否公平合理。本文所构建的三方演化博弈模型可为完善数据共享治理机制提供一定的参考依据。The digital economy has developed rapidly in recent years and has become an important economic development engine in the new era.Data,as a strategic resource for the development of the digital economy,in which enterprises can release massive amounts of data information,are playing an important role in data sharing,openness,and development and utilization.However,in recent years,frequent data leakage incidents have exposed a series of issues such as inadequate supervision and imperfect sharing mechanisms in data sharing.Given that data has become a strategic resource driving enterprise value creation,governments around the world are paying more and more attention to the governance of the enterprise data market.In May 2018,the EU enforced the General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR),which sets out the standards for personal data protection and requirements for enterprise data sharing.In addition,the EU is actively exploring a data pooling mechanism to facilitate data sharing among enterprises.China s Development and Reform Commission(DRC)and many other departments have also encouraged all types of subjects to voluntarily participate in data element sharing by issuing relevant documents and establishing laws and regulations to promote data sharing.The aim is to mitigate privacy risks and hazards and to enable openness and sharing of data.This study considers big data alliances,members of big data alliances,and relevant government departments,and conducts a theoretical analysis of the effective sharing of decision-making impact data among various entities based on the theory of tripartite evolutionary games.In view of the problems of free-riding by big data alliance members and data leakage caused by big data alliance malfeasance in the process of data sharing,this study constructed a three-party game model to explore the decision-making choices of the big data alliance,big data alliance members,and relevant government departments in data governance,analyzed the stability of the three-party evolution game,judged the
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