基于制度建设与职务消费的盈余管理行为抑制研究  

Research on the Inhibition of Earnings Management Behavior Based on Institutional Construction and Perks Consumption

作　　者：张斌[1] 王翠洁 徐琳[1] ZHANG Bin;WANG Cuijie;XU Lin(Anhui University of Finance&Economics,Bengbu,Anhui 233030,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《邢台学院学报》2024年第2期93-100,共8页Journal of Xingtai University

基　　金：2019年度安徽省高校人文社科研究重点项目:在职消费、反腐败与盈余管理.项目编号:SK2019A0473;2020年度安徽省高校人文社科研究重点项目:反腐败提升国有企业绩效了吗?——基于内部控制视角的研究.项目编号:SK2020A0023。

摘　　要：盈余管理是常见的财务操纵行为,其原因是多方面的,于国有企业而言,高管职务消费则是可能原因之一。基于沪深股市国有企业样本的研究表明,职务消费现象普遍存在,但仅当其规模超出行业平均水平时,才会通过盈余管理加以掩饰。同时,制度建设工作加强所带来的环境优化,有助于抑制盈余管理这种财务操纵行为,具体表现为随着制度建设力度的加强,职务消费与应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理间的正向关系都趋于弱化。研究结论为从外部环境视角抑制职务消费及衍生的盈余管理行为提供了线索和依据。Earnings management is a common financial manipulation behavior.There are many reasons.For state-owned enterprises,perks consumption of executives is one of the possible reasons.The research based on the sample of state-owned enterprises in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets shows that the phenomenon of perks consumption is widespread,but it will be masked by earnings management only when its scale exceeds the industry average.At the same time,the optimization of the institutional environment brought about by the strengthening of institutional construction helps to suppress the financial manipulation behavior of earnings management.Specifically,with the strengthening of institutional construction efforts,the positive relationship between perks consumption,accrued earnings management and real activity earnings management tends to weaken.The research conclusion provides clues and basis for restraining perks consumption and derived earnings management behavior from the perspective of external environment.

关 键 词：职务消费 制度建设 应计盈余管理 真实活动盈余管理 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]