大卫·路易斯模态实在论驳议  

Refuting Lewis's Modal Realism

作　　者：王聪 刘可怡 WANG Cong;LIU Keyi(School of Marxism,Henan Normal University,Xinxiang 453007,China)

机构地区：[1]河南师范大学马克思主义学院,河南新乡453007

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第3期43-50,共8页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(22FZXB087)。

摘　　要：大卫·路易斯模态实在论面临的一个主要问题就是要提供一个相应的模态认识论说明。路易斯本人为了辩护他的模态认识论提出了两个论证:基于类比于数学的论证和基于理论功效的论证。通过分析可以得出,路易斯的这两个论证并不能实现他的目的。其中最大的困难则是路易斯使用的IBE方法,因为IBE并不是真理导向的方法,IBE背后也存在逻辑问题。A significant problem facing David Lewis'Modal Realism is to provide a corresponding modal epistemology.Lewis presented two arguments in defense of his epistemology of modality,i.e.the argument based on the analogy with mathematics,ABAM,and the argument based on theoretical utility,ABTU.After analyzing it,we conclude that these two arguments of Lewis do not achieve his purpose.Moreover,one of the biggest difficulties is the IBE method used by Lewis.Based on the fact that IBE is not a truth-conductive approach and the logical issues behind IBE,we further refute both of Lewis'arguments.

关 键 词：大卫·路易斯 模态实在论 模态认识论 超内涵 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]