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作 者:孙安艺 胡加祥[1] Sun Anyi;Hu Jiaxiang
机构地区:[1]上海交通大学凯原法学院
出 处:《国际法研究》2024年第3期63-80,共18页Chinese Review of International Law
摘 要:随着国家安全内核的延展,部分WTO成员将不断泛化的国家安全利益置于国际经贸规则之上,以维护国家安全为由任意实施出口管制,出口管制安全化扩张趋势明显。这些成员多诉诸安全例外条款进行抗辩,打破了解决贸易安全争端的“外交默契”,加剧了国家主权与多边贸易秩序的冲突,并暴露出WTO出口贸易纪律的片面性以及WTO争端解决机构应对出口管制安全化扩张的局限性。实践中,成员从自身需求出发诠释安全例外条款,在适用上产生了“完全自决逻辑”与“相对自决逻辑”的分化,映射出不同程度的现实主义国家主权理念选择。尽管WTO争端解决机构在涉及安全例外的数起争端中采纳了“相对自决逻辑”,试图限制对安全例外条款的滥用,实际审理中却很难确立统一、稳定的衡量标准。对贸易安全争端的“司法干预”可能加剧WTO合法性危机。对此,成员应就“相对自决逻辑”的实践范式善意寻求共识,在保留灵活空间的基础上,强化国际经贸规则对出口管制措施和安全例外条款援用的价值与程序约束,从而抑制成员滥施出口管制,纾解争端解决机构面临的压力。With the extension of national security's connotation,some WTO members put their increasingly broadly interpreted national security interests above international trade rules and implement national security-rooted export controls in an arbitrary way,resulting in the obvious securitization expansion of export controls.Members often resort to the security exception clause as defense,breaking the “diplomatic privity” of settling trade-security disputes,which not only aggravates the conflict between national sovereignty and multilateral trading order,but also exposes the weakness of WTO export trade discipline and the limitations of WTO dispute settlement mechanism in coping with the securitization expansion of export controls.In practice,WTO members interpret the security exception clause based on their own needs,forming two opposing groups regarding its application,that is,“completely self-judging logic” and “relatively self-judging logic”,which reflects different degrees of choice regarding the realism sovereignty concepts.Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has adopted the “relatively self-judging logic” in several disputes involving security exceptions and has shown intention to restrict the abuse of security exception clause,it is still hard to establish a unified and stable measurement standard in actual dispute settlement procedures.Thus,“judicial intervention” in trade-security disputes may exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of the WTO.Within this context,members should seek consensus on the practice paradigm of “relatively self-judging logic”.While keeping room for flexibility,it is essential to strengthen the value and procedural constraints on the use of export control measures and security exception clauses through international trade rules,so as to curb members from arbitrarily imposing export controls,and to relieve the pressure on dispute settlement mechanism.
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