演化博弈视角下高校学报联合办刊策略  

Strategy of Joint Publication of University Journals from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：方兴林[1] FANG Xinglin(School of Economics and Management,Huangshan University,Huangshan 245021,China)

机构地区：[1]黄山学院经济管理学院,安徽黄山245021

出　　处：《常州工学院学报》2024年第3期100-104,共5页Journal of Changzhou Institute of Technology

基　　金：安徽省高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(gxyq2021021)。

摘　　要：引入协同增效收益及其分配系数、成本、投机收益、惩罚等影响因素,构建高校学报联合办刊演化博弈模型,求得演化均衡解。结果表明:协同增效收益、惩罚对演化博弈系统最佳稳定状态具有正向影响;成本、投机收益对演化博弈系统最佳稳定状态具有负向影响;存在合理的协同增效收益分配系数。联合办刊需要重视各高校学报办刊资源的异质性和互补性,加强顶层设计明晰各高校学报权、责、利,重视并有效减少联合办刊运营成本。Introducing synergistic gains and their distribution coefficients,costs,speculative gains,penalties and other influencing factors,a game model for the evolution of joint publication in colleges and universities is constructed,and an evolutionary equilibrium solution is found The results show that synergistic gains and penalties have a positive influence on the optimal stable state of the evolutionary game system;costs and speculative gains have a negative influence on the optimal stable state of the evolutionary game system;and there exists a reasonable synergistic gain distribution coefficient.Joint publication needs to pay attention to the heterogeneity and complementarity of the resources of each university journal,strengthen the top-level design,clarify the rights,responsibilities and benefits of each university journal,and pay attention to and effectively reduce the operating costs of joint publication.

关 键 词：高校学报 联合办刊 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：G237.5[文化科学]