出 处:《法学杂志》2024年第3期87-105,共19页Law Science Magazine
基 金:司法部2021年度法治建设与法学理论研究课题“人权保障视阈中的算法权力规制研究”(项目编号:2021SFB4022);2021年度广东省社科规划项目“算法治理的法治原则和规则研究”(项目编号:GD21YFX02);2021年度广州市哲学社会科学规划共建课题“算法歧视的规范治理”(项目编号:2021GZGJ228);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目编号:QNMS202201)的阶段性研究成果。
摘 要:个人信息兼具个体属性与公共属性。正确认识个人信息的双重属性及其复杂性是构建整全性的个人信息保护体系的起点。作为基本权利的个人信息权利具有消极和积极两个面相,体现了个人信息权利的防御性功能,亦要求国家承担个人信息保护义务。宪法基本权利框架为容纳个人信息权利提供了可能的限度,但囿于个人信息保护客体和通信权、隐私权、名誉权等既有基本权利存在差异,宜将个人信息权利理解为人格尊严项下的新型权利。如果笼统地将个人信息权利归入《宪法》第38条人格尊严条款进而将其作为一般人格权对待,则忽略了数字时代中个人信息保护背后所折射的具体人格权益。一般人格权保护方案的处理不利于个人信息保护,遮蔽了其权利本质,而依附于其他权利显然无法形成周延的保护体系,且提高了保护的成本。反对个人信息权利化的理由,无论基于基本权利的信息化场景还是个人信息的保护强度区分论,都不能否认个人信息保护背后所蕴含的人格利益的正当性基础。因此,不应只满足于一般人格权的过渡式保护方案,应努力推进将个人信息权利定位为人格尊严条款项下的新型权利,以回应新兴技术背景下人格利益保障的正当诉求。Personal information possesses both individual attributes and public attributes,and a proper understanding of its dual nature is crucial in constructing a comprehensive system for personal information protection.As a fundamental right,the right to personal information has both defensive and proactive aspects,reflecting the defensive function of individual information rights and also requiring the state to assume the obligation of personal information protection.The framework of fundamental rights provides a possibility for accommodating the right to personal information,but due to the differences in the objects of personal information protection and the existing fundamental rights such as the right to communication,the right to privacy,and the right to reputation,it is appropriate to understand the right to personal information as a new type of right under human dignity.If the right to personal information is treated as a general personality right under Article 38 of the Constitution regarding the human dignity,it overlooks the specific personality right reflected in personal information protection in the digital age.The treatment of general personality rights protection schemes is not conducive to the protection of personal information,obscures the essence of its rights,and is dependent on other rights,which is obviously cannot form a comprehensive protection system and increases the cost of protection.The reasons against the right to personal information,whether based on information scenarios based on basic rights or the distinction of personal information protection intensity,cannot deny the legitimacy of the personal interests inherent in personal information protection.Therefore,it should not only satisfy the transitional protection scheme of general personality rights,but also strive to position the right to personal information as a new type of right under the clause of human dignity,in response to the legitimate demands for protecting personal interests in the context of emerging technology.
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