数字经济下个人信息使用和保护平衡的三方演化博弈分析  

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Balance Between Personal Information Use and Protection in the Digital Economy

作　　者：张世颖[1] 田瑶 ZHANG Shiying;TIAN Yao

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学商业经济研究院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028 [2]哈尔滨商业大学经济学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《商业经济》2024年第5期21-24,31,共5页Business & Economy

基　　金：黑龙江省博士后科研启动金项目:基于景气指数的黑龙江省科技创新监测及预警研究(LBH-Q21104);黑龙江省高等教育教学改革项目:加强学科竞赛管理促进高校创新型人才培养(SJGY20210422);首批省级新文科研究与改革实践项目:经管类跨学科专业综合实训课程建设(2021HLJXWP0104)。

摘　　要：构建以政府(G)、个人信息所有者(P)和个人信息获取/使用者(C)三方为主体的动态博弈模型,分析其演化过程。通过对以政府为驱动的三方博弈的演化路径分析,从三方的角度分别提出对策建议。研究结果表明,政府实施严格监管可以提升自身形象和管理效率。政府应主要采用惩罚手段,使个人信息获取/使用者在违规策略下产生较高的成本,从而促使他们采取规范获取和使用的策略。对于个人信息所有者而言,政府及时发现违规行为并严格处理,同时积极宣传个人信息维护,可激励他们采取积极提供个人信息的策略。在这种情况下,三方可实现帕累托最优的策略均衡,并实现在数字经济下个人信息使用和保护的平衡。The paper analyzes the evolutionary process by constructing a dynamic game model with the government(G),personal information owner(P),and personal information acquisition/user(C)as the main players.By analyzing the evolutionary path of the three party game driven by the government,it proposes suggestions from the perspectives of the three parties.The research results indicate that implementing strict regulation by the government can enhance its own image and management efficiency.The government should mainly take punitive measures to make personal information acquisition/users incur higher costs under violation strategies,thereby encouraging them to adopt strategies with standardized acquisition and use.For personal information owners,timely detection of violations and strict handling by the government,while actively promoting personal information maintenance,can motivate them to adopt a strategy of actively providing personal information.In this case,the three parties can achieve a Pareto optimal strategy equilibrium to achieve a balance between the use and protection of personal information in the digital economy.

关 键 词：个人信息维护 个人隐私 动态博弈 博弈演化 信息规范使用 政府监管 

分 类 号：G203[文化科学—传播学]