报废政策视角下耐用品制造商决策研究  

The Decision-making of Durable Goods Manufacturers from the Perspective of Scrap Policy

作　　者：李任 王裕光 LI Ren;WANG Yuguang

机构地区：[1]新疆理工学院经济贸易与管理学院,新疆阿克苏843000

出　　处：《商业经济》2024年第7期142-145,192,共5页Business & Economy

基　　金：新疆理工学院校级科研项目:碳中和背景下南疆汽车产业低碳商业模式研究(SQ202404);教育部人文社科一般项目:碳中和背景下考虑P2P共享市场的制造商共享商业模式决策及其环境影响研究(21YJA630044)。

摘　　要：本研究分析了引导性报废政策和强制性报废政策对耐用品制造商的影响,构建了制造商最优定价和产品设计决策模型。结果显示:强制报废政策下,制造商不会生产超过报废年限的产品,适当补贴可增加需求但价格下降;引导报废政策下,产品设计寿命常超出自定年限,适当补贴能提升价格和需求,但可能导致资源浪费。补贴缺失时,强制报废政策会使制造商利润降低,而引导报废政策可通过价格和设计调整保持利润。强制报废为防止产品超期服役设定期限,但在相同补贴下,引导报废政策在提升消费者剩余和社会福利方面更有效。This study analyzes the impacts of incentivized scrap policies and mandatory scrap policies on durable goods manufacturers and constructs optimal pricing and product design decision models for manufacturers.The results indicate that under mandatory scrap policies,manufacturers will not produce products exceeding the scrap lifespan,and appropriate subsidies can increase demand while lowering prices.Under incentivized scrap policies,the product design lifespan often exceeds the designated lifespan,and appropriate subsidies can enhance prices and demand but may lead to resource wastage.In the absence of subsidies,mandatory scrap policies result in reduced profits for manufacturers,while incentivized scrap policies can maintain profits through price and design adjustments.Mandatory scrap sets a deadline to prevent products from being used beyond their designated lifespan,but under the same subsidy,incentivized scrap policies are more effective in enhancing consumer surplus and social welfare.

关 键 词：报废政策 经济分析 耐用品 效用理论 

分 类 号：F470[经济管理—产业经济]