中国金融体制改革的政治经济逻辑--基于控制权视角  

The Political and Economic Logic of China's Financial System Reform:Based on the Perspective of Control Rights

作　　者：陈启博 CHEN Qibo(School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084)

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2024年第2期33-44,共12页China Economic Studies

摘　　要：政府干预导致银行业资本恶化并最终累及经济发展是学界对于政府与银行关系的普遍认识。中国在近20年中保持着良好的银行资本绩效和稳健的经济增长,这与经典的金融发展理论恰恰相反。本文通过梳理中国金融体制改革的历史经验,基于控制权理论进行了解释:中央政府通过金融监管集权收回了分权化改革后缺失的对金融机构的剩余控制权,并为地方政府保留了金融资源配置权这一实际控制权以保持地方激励,从而缓解了央地委托代理关系中地方激励与代理风险之间的矛盾,并与地方主导型的经济增长模式实现了较好的适配。本文发展了一个基于央地关系激励相容机制的理论框架,为理解中国金融体制改革以及转轨国家政府与银行关系提供了新的理论启示。It is a common understanding of the relationship between the government and banks in the academic circle that government intervention leads to the deterioration of banks'capital and ultimately affects economic development.How-ever,as a country widely believed to have strong government intervention in the banking industry,China has maintained good bank capital performance and steady economic growth in the past two decades,which is contrary to the classical finan-cial development theory.By combing the historical experience of China's financial system reform,this paper explains it from the perspective of control rights:the central government recovers the residual right of control over financial institutions that was missing after the decentralization reform through centralized financial supervision,and retains the real right of control in financial resource allocation for local governments to maintain local incentives,thus alleviating the contradiction between lo-cal incentives and agency risks in the central-local principal-agent relationship.It has achieved a good adaptation to the lo-cally dominated economic growth model.This paper develops a theoretical framework based on the incentive compatibility mechanism of the central-local relationship,which provides new theoretical inspiration for understanding the reform of China's financial system and the relationship between the government and banks in countries in transition.

关 键 词：金融体制改革 政府干预 央地关系 不完全契约 剩余控制权 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]