演化论与生命世界的目的性  

Evolutionary Theory and the Telos of Life

作　　者：陆俏颖 Lu Qiaoyin

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京100871

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2024年第5期34-50,204,205,共19页Social Sciences in China

摘　　要：自从达尔文演化论被广泛接受,生命的适应目的性被认为可用机械的自然选择过程来解释。基于这一洞见,选择效应功能理论强调被选择的效应可为生物性状的存在提供溯因解释,这为生物学奠定了功能规范性的基础。主流的自然主义哲学从生物功能出发,试图为多个领域的规范性标准提供自然化分析。对比演化生物学的进展可得,诉诸选择效应功能的溯因解释并不具备真正的解释效力,这意味着生命世界中功能规范性的瓦解。对于溯因解释的推崇根植于设计论证中人造物与生命体的类比前提,拒斥这一前提才能摆脱传统目的论。自然主义哲学须舍弃生物功能的桥梁,为各类规范性另觅自然的基础。Since the widespread acceptance of Darwin's theory of evolution,life's adaptive telos has been considered explicable through the mechanical process of natural selection.Based on this insight,the received view of biological function emphasizes that the selected effects of traits can provide etiological explanations for the existence of those traits,thereby laying the foundation for functional normativity in biology.Fromfunctional normativity,mainstream naturalisticphilosophysuch as teleosemantics endeavors to naturalize normative standards in varioussfields.However,comparison to the explanations provided by current evolutionary biology reveals that etiological functional explanations lack genuine explanatory power,indicating the dissolution of biological functional normativity.The endorsement of the latter is rooted in the analogy between artifacts and living organisms,and only by rejecting this analogy can one break free from traditional teleology.Consequently,naturalistic philosophy must abandon the role of functional normativity as a bridge and explore alternative natural foundations for normative considerations.

关 键 词：达尔文演化论 选择效应功能 目的语义学 自然主义哲学 

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