基于主从博弈的智慧园区电价策略及用能优化  

Smart Park Pricing and Energy Optimization Strategy Based on Stackelberg Game

作　　者：龚彧 张运 胥峥 李欣 刘勇 肖红谊 吕干云[2] GONG Yu;ZHANG Yun;XU Zheng;LI Xin;LIU Yong;XIAO Hongyi;LYU Ganyun(Yancheng Power Supply Branch,State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Yancheng 224005,China;School of Electric Power Engineering,Nanjing Institute of Technology,Nanjing 211167,China)

机构地区：[1]国网江苏省电力有限公司盐城供电分公司,江苏盐城224005 [2]南京工程学院电力工程学院,江苏南京211167

出　　处：《南京工程学院学报（自然科学版）》2024年第1期78-82,共5页Journal of Nanjing Institute of Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国网江苏省电力有限公司科技项目(B110A3233U1D)。

摘　　要：针对传统园区用电用户友好互动性不足、缺乏市场价格机制引导问题,提出基于主从博弈的智慧园区电价策略及用能优化方法.首先分析智慧园区电能设备主要构成及用能行为;然后以园区为主体、用户为从体,提出基于主从博弈的用能优化调控方法,构建基于价格机制的运营模型,通过电价激励用户调整能源消耗,改善园区与用户的相互合作与互动,促进园区内清洁能源的消纳;最后采用YALMIP调用CPLEX进行模型求解.仿真测试结果验证了本文模型的有效性和经济性.In response to the lack of user-friendly interactivity in traditional parks and the absence of guidance from market price mechanisms,this paper proposes an electricity pricing strategy and energy optimization method for smart parks based on the master-slave game.Firstly,the main components of electrical equipment in wisdom parks and their energy usage behavior are analyzed.Subsequently,treating the park as the main entity and users as the subordinates,an energy consumption optimization and control model is established using the master-slave game framework.An operational model based on the park s pricing mechanism is then constructed,facilitating interaction between the park and users.This encourages users to adjust energy consumption according to electricity prices,thereby promoting the use of clean energy within the park.Finally,YALMIP is employed to invoke CPLEX to solve the model.The results validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed model.

关 键 词：智慧园区 主从博弈 价格机制 电价 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]