线上排他行为、阶段性特征与数字平台治理:三方动态博弈分析  

Online Exclusive Dealing, Developmental Stage and the Governance of Digital Platforms

作　　者：蔡跃洲[1,2,3] 王麒植 钟洲 CAI Yuezhou;WANG Qizhi;ZHONG Zhou(University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;Institute of Quantitative&Technological Economics,CASS;CASS Laboratory for Economic Big Data and Policy Evaluation;Center for China Fiscal Development,Central University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学应用经济学院,100732 [2]中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所,100732 [3]中国社会科学院经济大数据与政策评估实验室,100732 [4]中央财经大学中国财政发展协同创新中心,102206

出　　处：《经济研究》2024年第5期132-150,共19页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“数字经济高质量发展的创新与治理协同互促机制研究”(22&ZD071)的资助。

摘　　要：科学治理数字平台的线上排他行为是全球范围内的重要议题。国内外既有理论研究与现实案例更习惯于对相关行为进行“对”“错”判断,本文尝试提出第三条路径,即根据数字经济不同发展阶段的主要矛盾和个案具体情况,相机选择适宜的规制立场和监管措施。以中国数字经济发展为基础的三方动态博弈模型分析表明:线上排他行为既可能产生限制线上竞争的“选择限制效应”,也可能产生促进线上线下竞争的“投资保护效应”。在线上经济发展初期,投资“搭便车”问题的存在往往会使得投资保护效应带来的积极影响超过选择限制效应的消极影响,因而线上排他行为更可能提升社会福利。随着线上经济不断走向成熟,投资“搭便车”不再是主要矛盾,线上排他行为对线上竞争的负面影响逐渐显现,进而降低社会福利。阿里巴巴“双十一”购物节及“二选一”行为对电商发展产生的影响较好地印证了上述机制。本文认为,数字平台治理应根据其发展阶段相机行事,在用户培育期审慎包容线上排他行为以期实现与限期专利保护类似的积极效果,而在平稳成熟期则强化线上排他行为的反垄断规制以保障数字经济健康发展。Scientific governance of online exclusive dealing by digital platforms is one of the most controversial regulatory issues worldwide. Current research and antitrust cases often bifurcate into opposite conclusions of right or wrong. This paper proposes a synthetic direction, proposing a flexible regulatory stance and regulatory measures based on the developmental stages of the digital economy and case-by-case analysis.By constructing a tripartite game model, the paper analyzes the impact of online exclusive dealing on market competition and social welfare at different developmental stages of digital platforms. The research identifies an “investment protection effect” and a “choice restriction effect” of online exclusive dealing and further explores how different developmental stages of the online economy affect the performance of these two effects. The investment protection effect refers to the pro-competitive effect of online exclusive dealing by reducing free-riding on digital platform investments, which would make online and offline sellers compete more efficiently and thus increase social welfare. The choice restriction effect refers to the potential negative impact of online exclusive dealing on competition(between platforms) and welfare, as it may limit the choice of platform consumers and therefore the competition between platforms.This paper finds that the net welfare of online exclusive dealing is determined by the interplay of the investment protection and choice restriction effects, and thus varies across different stages of development. In the early stages of the digital economy(i.e., the user accumulation period), digital platforms often have to compete with their offline counterparts for consumers' attention.Such competition sometimes drives platforms to invest in promotion activities, including online and offline advertising, galas, and celebrity endorsements, in order to provide information about online products to consumers who previously only engaged in offline transactions. This investmen

关 键 词：线上线下竞争 排他行为 阶段性特征 数字平台 平台治理 

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