考虑非正式组织的动力电池生产者责任延伸回收模式研究  被引量:1

Research on Extended Recovery Model of Power Battery Producer Responsibility Considering Informal Organization

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作  者:高艳红[1] 黎振东 Gao Yanhong;Li Zhendong(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 401331)

机构地区:[1]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆401331

出  处:《管理评论》2024年第3期225-236,共12页Management Review

基  金:重庆市社会科学规划项目(2022NDYB69);重庆市教委人文社会科学项目(21SKGH039);重庆市教委科技项目(KJQN202000532)。

摘  要:基于大量废旧动力电池被非正式组织私自拆解倒卖的现实背景,首先,设计了非正式组织与责任企业合作回收废旧动力电池的回收模式,并通过构建地方政府、责任企业及非正式组织的三方演化博弈模型,分析了博弈三方各自策略的稳定性及各要素对策略选择的影响。其次,利用Lyapunov间接法对三方博弈系统的纯策略均衡点进行了稳定性分析,得出了最优策略组合所需满足的条件。最后,利用Matlab2017进行了仿真分析,验证了不同初始条件下模型分析的有效性,并结合结论对合作回收模式的实现及政府退出时机进行了阶段性推演。Based on the realistic background that a large number of used power batteries were dismantled and resold privately by informal organizations,this paper designs a recycling mode of cooperation between informal organizations and responsible enterprises to recycle power batteries.By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments,responsible enterprises and informal or⁃ganizations,we analyze the stability of the respective strategies of the three parties in the game and the influence of each factor on the strategy selection.Secondly,the stability of pure strategy equilibrium point of tripartite game system is analyzed by Lyapunov indirect method,and the conditions for optimal strategy combination are obtained.Finally,Matlab2017 is used to make a simulation analysis,which verifies the effectiveness of the model analysis under different initial conditions.Combined with the conclusion,the realization of cooperative recycling mode and the timing of government exit are deduced in stages.

关 键 词:废旧动力电池回收 非正式组织 责任企业 地方政府 

分 类 号:F713.2[经济管理—产业经济] F426.61

 

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