强人工智能刑事责任主体资格的否定  

The Negation of the Subjective Qualification of Criminal Liability of Strong Artificial Intelligence

作　　者：任彦君 聂冉 Ren Yanjun;Nie Ran(School of Criminal Justice,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou,China)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学刑事司法学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《社会科学论坛》2024年第4期132-141,共10页Tribune of Social Sciences

基　　金：2022年国家社会科学基金年度项目《数据刑事合规问题研究》阶段性研究成果,项目编号:22BFX064。

摘　　要：在是否应当赋予强人工智能刑事责任主体资格的论战中,否定论具有逻辑严密性与结论正当性。首先,从实证角度出发,在强人工智能的发展进路中,存在大量科技、哲学难题,强人工智能时代难以来临。其次,假设强人工智能存在,其所具备的辨认与控制能力也并无刑法意义,因此无法被认定为刑事责任主体。再次,对强人工智能施加刑罚,难以实现报应目的与预防目的。最后,基于刑法人类中心主义,理应排除强人工智能的刑事责任主体地位。In the debate on whether strong artificial intelligence should be given the qualification of criminal liability subject,the negation theory has logical rigour and justification of conclusion.Firstly,from the empirical point of view,there are a large number of scientific and technological and philosophical difficulties in the development of strong artificial intelligence,and it is difficult for the era of strong artificial intelligence to come.Secondly,if there is strong artificial intelligence,its ability to recognize and control has no meaning in criminal law,and therefore it cannot be recognized as a subject of criminal responsibility.Thirdly,it is difficult to achieve retributive and preventive purposes by imposing penalties on strong artificial intelligence.Finally,on the basis of anthropocentrism in criminal law,strong artificial intelligence should be excluded as a subject of criminal responsibility.

关 键 词：强人工智能 责任非难 报应 特殊预防 一般预防 

分 类 号：D924.1[政治法律—刑法学]