海事事故治理演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governance in Maritime Accidents

作　　者：江玉杰 JIANG Yu-jie(College of Transport and Communications,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海201306

出　　处：《广州航海学院学报》2024年第2期50-57,共8页Journal of Guangzhou Maritime University

摘　　要：为揭示海事事故治理主体行为的演化机理,基于演化博弈理论,构建地方政府、航运公司和船员三方演化博弈模型,并对模型进行理论推理与数值仿真分析.研究结果表明,船员不安全行为导致海事事故发生概率是影响各博弈主体策略选择的共性因素;三方协同治理海事事故的稳定性条件为:严格监管成本增量小于严格监管财政补贴,安全行为成本增量小于不安全行为惩罚额、事故对船员造成的损失、不安全行为责任成本三者之和;增加博弈主体初始治理意愿、提高地方政府惩罚强度与事故问责强度,可加快实现三方协同治理海事事故.To reveal the evolutionary mechanism of governance subject behavior in maritime accidents,a three-party evolutionary game model among local government,shipping companies and crew is constructed,and theoretical reasoning and numerical simulation analysis were conducted on this model.The research results indicate that the probability of maritime accidents caused by unsafe behavior of crew is a common factor affecting the strategic choices of each game subject.The stability conditions for tripartite collaborative governance of maritime accidents are:the strict regulatory cost increment is less than the strict regulatory financial subsidies;the safety behavior cost increment is less than the sum of penalty amount for unsafe behavior,losses caused to crew members by accidents,and responsibility cost for unsafe behavior.Increasing the initial governance willingness of game subjects,the intensity of local government punishment and accident accountability can accelerate the realization of tripartite collaborative governance of maritime accidents.

关 键 词：海事事故 治理主体 行为策略 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：U698.6[交通运输工程—港口、海岸及近海工程]