信息不对称下按需服务平台拥有不同类型代理人时的动态激励契约  

Dynamic Incentive Contract of On-Demand Service Platform with Different Types of Agents under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：孙中苗 徐琪[1] 张艳芬 Sun Zhongmiao;Xu Qi;Zhang Yanfen(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第5期241-253,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL014);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71832001);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金、东华大学研究生创新基金项目(CUSF-DH-D-2021062)。

摘　　要：针对信息不对称下按需服务平台同时拥有兼职与全职代理人时的动态激励问题,以平台服务商誉为状态变量,建立动态的委托代理模型,运用最优控制方法求解平台及代理人的均衡策略,通过参数分析和对比分析得到的研究结果表明:当平台由单一兼职或全职代理人转变为同时拥有两类代理人时,代理人的服务努力水平均会降低,平台对其激励强度应提高,平台向兼职代理人收取的担保金和向全职代理人提供的固定报酬随代理人对平台激励契约的敏感性而不同;且平台在三种模式下的最优服务努力投入并不相同。通过数值仿真发现,单一兼职代理人模式下按需平台收益最优,而全职代理人模式下按需平台的盈利能力最弱,同时拥有两类代理人模式时按需平台的收益次优。研究结论可为按需平台设计动态激励契约提供一定的参考。In recent years,with the rapid development of platform economy,on-demand service platforms such as instant grocery delivery,meal delivery and ride-hailing have gradually become a part of daily life.The agents of these platforms may be part-time or full-time,they have the autonomy of service effort,and it is private information,the platform cannot directly observe the degree of the agent's effort.And,with the change of market environment,the operation and market position of platform enterprises are not static,but more dynamic and continuous,and the incentive contract of the platform to the agent is not invariable,but constantly changing under the influence of many external factors.In this paper,for the dynamic incentive contract problem of ondemand platform with both part-time and full-time agents under asymmetric information,considering the participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints of agents,taking the change of platform service goodwill as the state variable,the dynamic incentive contract models of platform employing part-time,full-time and simultaneous agents are constructed respectively by using principal-agent theory,the optimal control method is used to solve the equilibrium strategy of platform and agent under different situations,the effects of service cost,information asymmetry,platform service goodwill and other related parameters are revealed,and the optimal decisions under different principal-agent models are compared and analyzed.The results suggest that:(1)When the service cost coefficient and risk sensitivity coefficient of a certain type of agent increase,the service effort level of this type of agent in different situations will decrease,and the platform enterprise should reduce the incentive intensity to it,but the platform does not need to change the incentive intensity to another type of agent.(2)When the initial service goodwill of the platform is low,the optimal trajectory of the guarantee money and incentive contract charged by the platform to the part-time agent will

关 键 词：共享经济 动态激励契约 兼职与全职代理人 最优控制论 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]