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作 者:秦琪璐 Qilu Qin(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi Jiangsu)
机构地区:[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡
出 处:《运筹与模糊学》2024年第2期738-754,共17页Operations Research and Fuzziology
摘 要:外卖拼团模式集结了多个消费者的需求,达成了更低的价格和更好的优惠条件越来越受到外卖消费者的青睐。然而外卖拼团行为的发生过程中牵扯到的“搭便车”现象会让消费者陷入既想获得价格折扣又不愿自己努力,只想坐享其成的现实困境,从而影响外卖拼团模式的长期健康发展。为此,本文充分考虑拼团分享奖励策略下的消费者效用均衡,研究不同佣金奖励形式与外卖产品定价策略的组合优化设计问题;最后,以消费者效用最大化为目标,揭示两种拼团分享奖励机制的适用情景,研究平台对两种奖励机制的优化选择问题。The takeaway group model combines the needs of multiple consumers and achieves lower prices and better terms and conditions that are increasingly favoured by takeaway consumers.However,the phenomenon of“free-riding”involved in the process of takeout grouping behaviour may put consumers into the dilemma of wanting to get price discounts but not wanting to work hard by themselves,and only wanting to enjoy their own benefits,thus affecting the long-term healthy development of the takeout grouping mode.Therefore,this paper takes into full consideration the consumer utility equilibrium under the group sharing reward strategy,and researches the optim-al design of the combination of different forms of commission rewards and the pricing strategy of takeaway products;finally,with the goal of consumer utility maximisation,it reveals the application scenarios of the two group sharing reward mechanisms,and researches the optimal selection of platforms for the two reward mechanisms.
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