偏向性用地政策如何强化了“隐性担保”预期——来自城投债市场的证据  

How do the biased land use policies reinforce the expectations of“implicit guarantee”:evidence from the city investment bond market

作　　者：金媛 周媛媛 张士成 王世尧 JIN Yuan;ZHOU Yuanyuan;ZHANG Shicheng;WANG Shiyao(School of Big Data Application and Economics,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550025,China;School of Economics,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学大数据应用与经济学院,贵州贵阳550025 [2]贵州财经大学经济学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2024年第4期89-100,共12页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金：贵州省哲学社会科学规划课题(21GZQN05);贵州财经大学在校学生科学研究项目(2022ZXSY020)。

摘　　要：针对我国地方债务超常规增长的现象,本文捕捉到导致“隐性担保”的更外生的制度性因素。2003年以来,中央将大量建设用地指标向中西部省份倾斜,而逐步收缩东部地区土地供应。本文从理论上说明偏向性用地政策强化了东部地区的“救助能力”以及中西部地区的“救助预期”,从而干扰了债券市场的定价机制。基于2009—2020年省级面板数据,利用固定效应估计发现:东部地区土地供给偏向程度每减少1单位,城投债发行信用利差下降1.03单位;中西部地区土地供给偏向程度每增加1单位,城投债发行信用利差下降0.63单位。偏向性用地指标稳定性每增加1个单位,偏向性用地政策对区域间城投债融资成本的干扰程度提高约4~5倍。研究结论表明中央政府更应注重政策间的协调配合,更加符合人口规模的用地指标调整可能间接提高债券市场资源配置效率,将中国地方债的违约风险治理研究从传统的财政金融视角拓展到土地要素空间配置之间的相互作用,可能是防范和化解地方隐性债务风险的有效途径。In view of the phenomenon of the extraordinary growth of local debt in China,this paper captures the more exogenous institutional factors leading to the"implicit guarantee".Since 2003,the central government has tilted a large number of construction land quotas to the central and western provinces,while gradually shrinking the land supply in the eastern region.Theoretically,this paper explicates that the biased land use policy strengthens the"bailout ability"in the eastern region and the"bailout expectation"in the central and western regions,thus interfering with the pricing mechanism of the bond market.Based on the provincial panel data from 2009 to 2020,the fixed effect estimation is used to reveal the following findings.As the degree of land supply bias in the eastern region decreases by every one unit,the credit spread of urban investment bond issuance decreases by 1.03 units.As the degree of land supply bias in the central and western regions increases by every one unit,the credit spread of urban investment bond issuance decreases by 0.63 units.As the stability of biased land use index increases by one unit,the interference degree of biased land use policy on the financing costs of inter-regional urban investment bonds increases by about four to five times.It is concluded that the central government should pay more attention to the coordination and cooperation between policies,and the adjustment of land use index that is more in line with the population scale may indirectly improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the bond market.It may be an effective way to prevent and resolve local hidden debt risks through extending the study of governance of default risks in China's local debts from the traditional financial perspective to the mutual interaction of spatial allocation of land elements.

关 键 词：“隐性担保”预期 偏向性用地政策 隐性债务融资成本 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学] F301.2