“合意”的判定——纵向限制的反垄断规制竞合与路径选择  

Determination of“Consensuality”:Regulatory Overlaps and Choices on Vertical Restraints from Anti-monopoly Law

作　　者：孟雁北[1] 王明泽 Meng Yanbei;Wang Mingze

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院,北京100872

出　　处：《探索与争鸣》2024年第5期113-123,179,共12页Exploration and Free Views

摘　　要：反垄断立法对垄断行为进行的类型化选择,产生了纵向限制中纵向非价格垄断协议条款和滥用市场支配地位条款规制竞合的可能性。由于纵向非价格垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位行为违法构成要件与分析框架不同,选择不同的规制路径会影响纵向限制行为违法与否的认定结果,也会在确定被处罚主体时呈现差异性。因此,当我国《反垄断法》实施中出现两者的规制竞合时,为了准确选择对纵向限制行为的规制路径,建议以合意为规制选择的判断标准,构成合意的原则上以纵向非价格垄断协议规制,不构成合意的原则上选择滥用市场支配地位规制。在认定纵向限制行为是否存在合意时,可按照是否构成形式合意或实质合意来判断,以此回应我国反垄断执法与司法中一直存在的如何破解纵向非价格垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位规制竞合的困惑,也可以在一定程度上激活我国《反垄断法》中一直沉睡的纵向非价格垄断协议条款。Typological choices about monopolistic conduct give rise to the possibility of regulatory overlaps between vertical non-price monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant market position on vertical restraints from Anti-monopoly Law.Due to the difference in the constitutive elements and analytical framework of the violation of the vertical non-price monopoly agreement provisions and the abuse of dominant market position provisions,the choice of different regulatory paths will affect the determination results whether the vertical restraints violate Anti-monopoly Law or not,and will also present differences in the determination of the subject to be punished.Therefore,when there are regulatory overlaps between vertical non-price monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant position in the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law in China,it is suggested that consensuality is the criterion for the selection of regulatory path.In determining whether there is consensual vertical restraint,it can be examined in accordance with whether it constitutes formal or substantive consent,so as to activate to a certain extent the dormant vertical non-price monopoly agreement provisions of China’s Antimonopoly Law.

关 键 词：纵向垄断协议 滥用市场支配地位 规制竞合 合意 规制选择 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]