普特南对塔斯基真之定义的批判为何不能成立?  

Why Putnam Has Not Refuted Tarski's Definition of Truth?

作　　者：张莉[1] 黄晓[1] ZHANG Li;HUANG Xiao(School of Education,Zhejiang Normal University,Jinhua 321004,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江师范大学教育学院,金华321004

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2024年第5期67-72,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“西方百年元伦理学史研究”(19ZDA036)。

摘　　要：塔斯基的真之理论是历史上极具影响力的形式化真之理论,促成了当代公理化真之理论与紧缩主义真之理论研究的潮流。普特南对塔斯基的真之定义提出诸多质疑,拷问T模式、指称和翻译等语义概念与真概念之间的关系。立足于塔斯基真之理论的相关文献,借助语言哲学中的诸多理论,反驳普特南对塔斯基真之理论的批判,并点明这一议题具有的理论价值。Tarski's semantic definition of truth is highly influential in the history of formalised truth theories.It inspired the development of contemporary axiomatic and deflationary truth theories.Putnam criticised Tarski's definition of truth,urging philosophers to inquire the relation between T schema,semantic concepts such as reference,meaning,translation and truth more thoroughly.Based on Tarski's formulation of his truth theory,this paper refutes Putnam's critique of Tarski's definition in light of mainstream theories from philosophy of language,and shows how the discussion of this topic can contribute to contemporary construction of theories of truth.

关 键 词：塔斯基 真之定义 普特南 语言哲学 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]