数字出版物的最优信息披露策略研究:以电子书为例  

Optimal information disclosure strategy of digital publications:Taking e-books as an example

作　　者：李康[1] 许伟[2] 张伦传[1] Li Kang;Xu Wei;Zhang Lunchuan(School of Mathematics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;School of Information,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学数学学院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学信息学院,北京100872

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2024年第3期383-394,480,共13页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72271233);苏州市人工智能与社会治理技术重点实验室资助项目(SZS2023007);苏州独墅湖科教创新区智能社会治理技术与创新应用平台资助项目(YZCXPT2023101)。

摘　　要：考虑电子书厂商信息披露策略,即提供免费试读样章供消费者在线试读.基于消费者购买决策取决于免费试读和口碑效应两个因素的基本假设,构建了电子书信息披露策略的数学模型并进行求解,通过更新函数衡量信息披露对消费者的认知改变,分析厂商收益的最优化问题.结果表明,最优信息披露策略取决于消费者初始认知和实际质量之间的相对大小关系.最优的信息披露量和价格受到初始认知、实际质量和口碑效应影响,两个决策变量之间的交互影响关系也在文中讨论.研究结果为厂商的信息披露策略以及定价策略提供理论性的指导和借鉴.E-book manufacturers adopt the strategy of information disclosure.That is,to offer free reading samples for consumers to read online.This paper constructs and solves a game-theoretic model of e-book information disclosure strategy based on the basic assumption that consumer purchase decisions depend on two factors:Free trial and word-of-mouth effect.Changes in Consumers’perception due to their free trials are measured through the update function.Three optimization problems for manufacturers are analyzed,respec-tively.The results show that the optimal information disclosure strategy depends on the relationship between consumers’initial cognition and actual quality.The optimal amount of information disclosure and pricing are affected by initial cognition,actual quality,and word-of-mouth effects.The interactive relationship between the two decision variables is also discussed.The research results can provide theoretical guidance and references for manufacturers’information disclosure strategies and pricing strategies.

关 键 词：电子书 信息披露 试读样章 信息商品 定价模型 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]