一种计及风险偏好的计算卸载激励远期合同  

A Computational Offloading Incentive Forward Contract Taking into Account Risk Appetite

作　　者：张碧玲 焦正阳 刘家华 郭彩丽[1] ZHANG Biling;JIAO Zhengyang;LIU Jiahua;GUO Caili(School of Information and Communication Engineering,Beijing University of Post and Telecommunication,Beijing 100876,China)

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学信息与通信工程学院,北京100876

出　　处：《电子与信息学报》2024年第6期2619-2626,共8页Journal of Electronics & Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(62171060)。

摘　　要：边缘计算网络中,为了激励边缘计算节点(ECNs)参与计算卸载,以缓解计算服务供应商(SP)的计算压力,研究面向远期交易的激励机制。考虑到SP与ECNs之间的信息不对称,且ECN闲置计算资源的不确定性易导致合作风险,基于合同理论,该文提出一种计及风险偏好的计算卸载远期合同激励机制。首先,建立节点风险偏好模型;接着,定义个人理性(IR)约束和激励相容(IC)约束,将激励问题建模为最大化SP收益的远期合同设计问题;最后,化简约束并求解最优远期合同。仿真结果验证了所设计的远期合同的可行性和合理性,并证明该合同能有效激励ECNs参与计算卸载,提升了SP的收益。In edge computing networks,to stimulate the Edge Computing Nodes(ECNs)to assist in computation offloading to relieve the pressure of computing Service Provider(SP),a forward transaction oriented incentive mechanism is studied.Considering that there is information asymmetry between SP and ECNs and the uncertainty of ECNs idle resources can lead to cooperation risks,a risk-aware forward incentive mechanism based on contract theory for computation offloading is proposed.Firstly,a risk preference model for nodes is established;and then the Individual Rationality(IR)constraints and Incentive Compatibility(IC)constraints are defined,and the incentive problem is modeled as a forward contract design problem to maximize the benefits of SP;finally,the optimal forward contract is derived after constraint simplification.The simulation results verify the feasibility and rationality of the proposed forward contract,and prove that the contract can effectively incentivize ECNs to participate in computation offloading and increase the profits of SP.

关 键 词：计算卸载 合同理论 远期合同 风险偏好 

分 类 号：TN919[电子电信—通信与信息系统]