颠覆性创新中政府、企业与消费者三方的博弈关系和决策演化机制  

The Game Relationship and Decision-Making Evolution Mechanism Between the Government,Enterprises,and Consumers in the Disruptive Innovation

作　　者：刘雨农 倪晓雨 郑彦宁[1] Liu Yunong;Ni Xiaoyu;Zheng Yanning(China Institute of Science and Technology Information,Beijing 100038,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术信息研究所,北京100038

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2024年第12期10-16,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目“全球创新主体创新感知系统”(2019YFA0707203)。

摘　　要：颠覆性创新需要政府、企业、消费者的共同参与和深度协作,厘清三方主体在颠覆性创新中的博弈关系和决策演化机制是进一步优化颠覆性创新环境、推动企业开展颠覆性创新的关键问题。然而现有颠覆性创新研究主要聚焦于技术突破层面,未把颠覆性创新置于真实的市场环境下,普遍忽略了消费者这一关键核心要素。因此,基于博弈论构建政府、企业、消费者三方的颠覆性技术创新决策动态演化博弈矩阵,综合考量三方的协同与竞争关系,并结合数值仿真阐释三方博弈策略演化过程,探讨3个关键变量——增加的政府补贴总额、企业挪用政府补贴用于渐进性创新需要付出的额外损失、企业颠覆性创新成功概率,剖析不同博弈主体在颠覆性创新中的策略选择、演化趋势和稳定条件。结果表明:短期内少量政府补贴能够刺激企业开展颠覆性创新,但长期性、大力度补贴容易导致企业对公共资源产生依赖,并增加投机风险,同时政府在支持颠覆性创新上相较于企业具有更大的试错空间,但也需要承担补贴带来的财政压力;消费者需求对颠覆性创新具有决定性作用,消费者认可的产品能够对企业决策产生根本性影响。因此,政府应谨慎评估潜在颠覆性创新的机遇和风险,以营造良好创新环境为第一优先事项,充分发挥市场在颠覆性创新中的决定作用。Disruptive innovation requires the collaborative involvement and deep cooperation of the government,enterprises,and consumers.Clarifying the game relationships and decision evolution mechanisms among these three parties is crucial for optimizing the environment for disruptive innovation and promoting enterprises to engage in such innovations.However,the existing disruptive innovation research mainly focuses on the technological breakthrough level,does not put the disruptive innovation in the real market environment,and generally ignores the key core element of consumers.According to this situation,based on the game theory,this paper constructs a tripartite game matrix involving the government,enterprises,and consumers,comprehensively considers the cooperative and competitive relationships among these parties,systematically analyzes their strategy choices and the equilibrium points of the game system,further discuss the three key variables,which as the total amount of increased government subsidies,the additional loss that enterprises misappropriating government subsidies for incremental innovation,the success probability of enterprise disruptive innovation,uses numerical simulations to illustrate the evolution process of the game strategies,examines the strategy choices,evolution trends,and stable conditions of different game participants in disruptive innovation.The result reveals that short-term,small-scale subsidies can stimulate enterprises to undertake disruptive innovation,whereas long-term,substantial subsidies may lead to dependency on public resources and increase speculative risks.The government has more room for trial and error in supporting disruptive innovation than enterprises do,but it also needs to bear the financial burden of subsidies.Consumer demand plays a decisive role in disruptive innovation,as products recognized by consumers can fundamentally influence enterprise decisions.Therefore,the government should cautiously assess the opportunities and risks of potential disruptive innovations,pri

关 键 词：颠覆性创新 创新决策 博弈关系 消费者需求 政府决策 决策演化 演化博弈 三方博弈 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32[文化科学] G301