税收征管数字化对企业代理成本的影响——来自“金税三期”工程的数据  

On the Influence of Digital Tax Administration on Corporate Agency Costs—Insights from the"Gold Tax Phase III"Project

作　　者：余红艳[1] 周航 YU Hong-yan;ZHOU Hang(School of Finance and Public Management,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui,233030,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学财政与公共管理学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《西华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第4期61-73,共13页Journal of Xihua University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“减税政策与制造业高质量发展:效应评估、路径识别与策略优化”(项目编号:72003001)。

摘　　要：企业内控缺陷和财务舞弊丑闻的频频发生,反映出其背后委托代理问题的严重性。税收征管数字化可以抑制管理层利己投机动机,减少代理问题,降低代理成本。借助“金税三期”这项准自然实验,选取2011—2018年A股上市公司数据,采用多期DID模型探究税收征管数字化对代理成本的具体效应。结果显示,税收征管数字化通过改善信息环境和完善内部控制抑制代理成本水平。管理层持股对税收征管数字化的效应发挥了调节作用;公司治理水平与税收征管数字化之间存在替代关系;税收征管数字化的治理效应在信息透明度低、两职合一的企业中更为显著。The prevalence of internal control failures and financial fraud scandals underscores the severity of the principal-agent problem.The digitization of tax collection and management can mitigate managerial self-interest,thereby reducing agency problems and associated costs.Leveraging the quasi-natural experiment of"Golden Tax Phase III",this study examines data from A-share listed companies spanning 2011 to 2018.Employing a staggered difference-in-difference model,we explore how digital tax management specifically impacts agency costs.Our findings demonstrate that digitalization significantly lowers agency costs by enhancing the information environment and strengthening internal controls.Additionally,management shareholding moderates the effects of digital tax management,while corporate governance levels exhibit an inverse relationship with the degree of tax digitalization.Notably,the governance benefits of tax management digitization are more pronounced in firms with lower information transparency and dual leadership roles.

关 键 词：税收征管 数字化 金税三期 代理成本 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]