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作 者:张剑[1] 付意成[1] 彭文启[1] 赵进勇[1] 朱启林 ZHANG Jian;FU Yicheng;PENG Wenqi;ZHAO Jinyong;ZHU Qilin(State Key Laboratory of Simulation and Regulation of River Basin Water Cycle,China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research,Beijing 100038,China;Beijing Water Planning Institute,Beijing 101117,China)
机构地区:[1]中国水利水电科学研究院流域水循环模拟与调控国家重点实验室,北京100038 [2]北京市水务规划研究院,北京101117
出 处:《水利学报》2024年第6期654-665,共12页Journal of Hydraulic Engineering
基 金:中国水科院科研专项(WE0145B042021);2023年度北京水务科技开放项目(基于多因素驱动演化分析的城市水网适宜性评估模型研究)。
摘 要:流域生态补偿是实现流域环境改善与区域经济均衡发展的一种政策工具,对消除上下游地区间的经济差异影响,实现区域社会发展的公平性具有重要意义。为定量寻求多元信息扰动下的流域生态补偿标准最优解,亟需开展基于多维关系协调及经济利益分配多目标优化求解的动态均衡博弈研究。以实现生态补偿标准讨价还价贝叶斯纳什均衡为目标,借助完全信息博弈的混合均衡策略实施过程探讨流域生态补偿标准均衡解存在条件,并基于流域上下游间的动态转移支付进行生态补偿标准均衡解求解,依托激励相容机制开展讨价还价的动态博弈贝叶斯均衡的合理性分析。本文结合弥河流域经济社会取用水费用标准及水资源使用价值的变化规律,在流域生态保护和社会经济发展基本均衡的情况下,下游的寿光市、中游的青州市对上游临朐县的水量-水质生态补偿额度分别为3194万元、859万元。本文给出的研究方法可用于处理博弈过程中的冗余信息以便于进行讨价还价,形成合理的流域生态补偿标准。Watershed eco-compensation is a policy tool to realize the improvement of watershed environment and the balanced development of regional economy,which is of great significance to eliminate the influence of economic difference between upper and lower regions and realize the fairness of regional social development.In order to find the optimal solution of the ecological compensation standard in the watershed under multivariate information disturbance,it is urgent to carry out the dynamic equilibrium game research based on multi-dimensional relationship coordination and multi-objective optimization of economic benefit distribution.To achieve the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of watershed eco-compensation standard(WECS)bargaining in the game,the existence conditions of the equilibrium solution of eco-compensation standard based on the mixed equilibrium game implementation process was studied.To carry out the complete information dynamic game,the equilibrium solution of WECS based on the dynamic transfer payment was solved,and the rational analysis of dynamic Bayesian Equilibrium Game of bargaining based on incentive compatibility mechanism was also discussed.Combined with the variation law of socio-economic water intake-utilization standards and the use value,the city of Shouguang&Qingzhou should pay Linqu county 31.94 million Yuan and 8.59 million Yuan as WECS per year,respectively.The research method presented in the paper can be used to deal with the redundant information in the process of game so as to facilitate bargaining and obtain the optimal solution of dynamic game process.The research results provide support for improving the measurement system of WECS related water and help to enrich the implementation mechanisms of eco-compensation.
关 键 词:均衡博弈 贝叶斯均衡 讨价还价 流域生态补偿标准 效率性
分 类 号:F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]
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