董事忠实义务规范体系的再审视  

Re-examination of the Normative System of Directors̓Duty of Loyalty

作　　者：王琦 WANG Qi(Institute of Law,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100720,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院法学研究所,北京100720

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2024年第3期98-114,共17页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社科基金社科学术社团主题学术活动项目“公众公司的制度机理与立法范式研究”(23STA020)。

摘　　要：2023年修订的《公司法》对于董事忠实义务规范进行系统重构,形成了概念明确、逻辑清晰、体系融洽的董事忠实义务规范群。在外部体系上,董事忠实义务具有独立的规范价值,其制度定位与董事的注意义务、诚信义务存在显著不同。在内部体系上,以利益冲突行为与潜在利益冲突行为的差异为基础,《公司法》构建起董事忠实义务的二元规范进路:利益冲突行为受到法律的绝对禁止,而潜在利益冲突行为经过公司内部的程序性审查后可依法实施。归入责任作为董事违反忠实义务的法律后果,无论将其作为损害赔偿数额的确定方式还是独立的责任形态,均不会对公司利益的保护产生实质性影响。The Corporation Law amended in 2023 systematically reconstructs the norms of directors̓duty of loyalty to form a normative group of directors̓duty of loyalty with unambiguous concepts,clear logic and harmonious system.In the external system,the directors̓duty of loyalty has independent normative value,and its insititutional positioning is significantly different from the directors̓duty of care and duty of good faith.In terms of internal system,the Corporation Law amended in 2023 establishes a dual normative approach of duty of loyalty on the basis of distinguishing between conflicts of interest behaviors and potential conflicts of interest behaviors.Conflicts of interest behaviors are absolutely prohibited,while potential conflicts of interest behaviors can be implemented after procedural review within the corporation.As the legal consequence of directors̓s breach of duty of loyalty,whether it is regarded as the way to determine the amount of damages or an independent form of liability,it will not have a substantial impact on the protection of corporate interests.

关 键 词：忠实义务 信义关系 利益冲突行为 实质公平标准 归入责任 

分 类 号：DF411.92[政治法律—经济法学]