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作 者:陈慧倩 高金敏 CHEN Huiqian;GAO Jinmin(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China)
出 处:《上海工程技术大学学报》2024年第2期132-138,204,共8页Journal of Shanghai University of Engineering Science
基 金:教育部人文社会科学研究项目资助(23YJC790027)。
摘 要:基于演化博弈理论,考虑租赁双方为母子公司的新型关系,构建政府、航空公司及租赁公司三方演化博弈模型,运用系统动力学(SD)方法进行策略动态仿真,并对影响演化策略的关键因素进行敏感性分析。当政府增大社会效益及政府积极监管时,航空公司对租赁公司采取“对抗”策略时的惩罚金额以及租赁公司的额外收益增大,航空租赁市场进入成熟期速度加快。研究结果为新型关系下租赁市场加速进入成熟期提供方向,也为政府制定飞机租赁关联方监管政策提供理论依据。Based on the evolutionary game theory and considering the new relationship between the leasing parties as parent-subsidiary companies,a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,airlines and leasing companies was constructed,the system dynamics(SD)method was used to conduct dynamic simulation of strategies,and sensitivity analysis was conducted on key factors affecting evolutionary strategies.When the government enhances social benefits and actively regulates,the penalty imposed on leasing companies by airlines adopting an'antagonistic'strategy increases,and so does the additional revenue of leasing companies,thereby accelerating the maturity of the aviation leasing market.The research results can provide the direction for the leasing market to accelerate its maturation under the new relationship,and also a theoretical basis for the government to formulate regulatory policies for aircraft leasing affiliates.
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