药品安全治理演化博弈及策略研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game and Strategy of Drug Safety Governance

作　　者：谢振雨 万安霞 XIE Zhenyu;WAN Anxia(School of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing 210044,China)

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,南京210044

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2024年第2期129-136,160,共9页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：教育部人文社科项目(20YJAZH096)。

摘　　要：针对药品安全治理中信息不对称和主体行为隐蔽等导致的规制俘获问题,利用演化博弈理论构建了三方演化博弈模型,模型包括国家药监局、地方药监局和药品生产企业三方。计算了演化稳定策略(ESS)并进行仿真分析。研究发现各参数对药监局被规制俘获的影响,并重点分析了国家药监局对地方药监局和药品生产企业的惩罚力度参数,基于结果从政府角度提出了药品安全治理的相关建议。This paper tries address the problem of regulatory capture in drug safety governance resulting from information asymmetry and hidden behavior of subjects.To achieve this,this paper employs evolutionary game theory to construct a three-party evolutionary game model that includes the State Drug Administration,the local Drug Administration,and the drug manufacturer.Then the Evolutionary Stability Strategies(ESS)are obtained,and a simulation analysis is conducted to analyze the impact of each parameter on the regulatory capture of the drug administrations.In addition,this paper focuses on the effects of the penalty intensity of the State Drug Administration on the local Drug Administration and drug manufacturers.Based on the findings,recommendations are provided for the government.

关 键 词：药品安全治理 规制俘获 主体行为 演化博弈 

分 类 号：R95[医药卫生—药学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]