竞争还是合作:纵向财政关系改革下的政府行为抉择  

Competition or Cooperation:The Choice of Governments'Behavior under Vertical Fiscal Relation Reform

作　　者：赵旭杰[1] 宁静[2] 张圣哲 余超 ZHAO Xujie;NING Jing;ZHANG Shengzhe;YU Chao(School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics;Institute of Finance and Economics,Central University of Finance and Economics;International School of Business and Finance,SUN YAT-SEN University;School of Statistics,University of International Business and Economics)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院 [2]中央财经大学财经研究院,100081 [3]中山大学国际金融学院 [4]对外经济贸易大学统计学院

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2024年第5期111-126,共16页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17CJY052);国家自然科学基金项目(71503289)的资助。

摘　　要：纵向财政关系的规范与协调是建立现代财政制度的必要条件。本文从省直管县财政体制改革入手,探究了纵向财政关系改革下纵向层级政府在财政竞争与合作行为之间如何抉择的问题。本文基于1997—2009年全国县级面板数据,利用计量模型开展实证分析后发现,当地级市的财政利益因省直管县财政体制改革受损时,总体来看其下辖的非改革县的财政支出和转移支付将会增加,这表明地级市为弥补自身利益会对余下非改革县进行帮扶以求合作共赢。此外,异质性分析结果表明:“强市弱县”情况下的地级市和组织政府性基金收入能力强的地级市对余下非改革县的帮扶力度较大;地级市主要借助于专项转移支付工具对余下非改革县进行帮扶而非一般性转移支付。Intergovernmental vertical fiscal competition and cooperation are important issues in the research of vertical fiscal relations.China's initiation of the Province-Managing-County(PMC)reform in 2004 provided a favorable opportunity to explore the dynamic choices of intergovernmental vertical fiscal competition and cooperation under the reform of vertical fiscal relations.Since the PMC reform was not uniformly implemented but rather piloted in certain provinces,there are both reformed and non-reformed counties under the same prefecture-level city.This situation provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the decision-making of intergovernmental vertical fiscal competition or cooperation under the changes in vertical fiscal relations.Before and after the reform,the fiscal affairs of non-reformed counties were under the direct jurisdiction of prefecture-level cities.If prefecture-level cities where these counties were located initiated pilot reforms of the PMC,these non-reformed counties became what we term“remaining non-reformed counties.”Since prefecture-level cities might incur financial losses due to the reform,prefecture-level cities no longer had direct fiscal jurisdiction over reformed counties,nor influence over their fiscal interests.However,the fiscal affairs of remaining non-reformed counties continued to be directly managed by prefecture-level cities.Therefore,prefecture-level cities,in addition to their own efforts,might engage in vertical fiscal competition or cooperation with remaining non-reformed counties to compensate for their own interests,thus potentially impacting the fiscal situation of these counties.Based on this premise,the dynamic choice problem of intergovernmental vertical fiscal competition or cooperation can be explored under the reform of vertical fiscal relations.To analyze this,we utilized county-level panel data from 1997 to 2009 and constructed a DID model to conduct empirical analysis.The findings suggest that when prefecture-level cities suffered financial losses due to

关 键 词：纵向财政关系 省直管县财政体制改革 财政竞争与合作 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]