失业保险金给付的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Unemployment Insurance Payment

作　　者：章梦影 Mengying Zhang(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai)

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2024年第3期129-135,共7页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：就业是最大的民生,失业保险制度作为社会发展的稳定器,对保障失业人员基本生活、促进其再就业发挥了重要作用。面对失业保险金给付中存在的劳动激励性不足问题,通过博弈模型对发放失业保险金过程中政府与失业人员的策略进行分析,探讨失业保险金给付水平的激励性。得出的主要结论是:平均水平失业保险金的水平越高,失业人员越倾向于努力找工作,但最高梯度的失业保险金水平升高会降低失业人员努力找工作的概率。因此,失业保险金应保持在合理水平,并不是越高越好。Employment is the biggest livelihood of the people.As a stabilizer of social development,the unemployment insurance system plays an important role in ensuring the basic life of the unemployed and promoting their re-employment.In the face of the problem of insufficient labor incentive in the payment of unemployment insurance benefits,this paper analyzes the strategies of the government and the unemployed in the process of issuing unemployment insurance benefits through the game model,and discusses the incentive of the level of unemployment insurance benefits.The main conclusion is that the higher the average level of unemployment insurance,the more likely the unemployed are to try to find a job,but the highest gradient of unemployment in surance level will reduce the probability of unemployed people trying to find a job.Therefore,unemployment insurance should be maintained at a reasonable level,not the higher the better.

关 键 词：失业保险金 给付水平 博弈论 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]