Manufacturer encroachment and carbon reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy and retailer investment  

作　　者：Pengpeng YUAN Jiasen SUN Dmitry IVANOV 

机构地区：[1]Business School and Dongwu Think Tank,Soochow University,Suzhou 235031,China [2]Berlin School of Economics and Law,Berlin 999035,Germany

出　　处：《Frontiers of Engineering Management》2024年第2期326-344,共19页工程管理前沿（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871153 and 72371179);the sponsorship of the Tang Scholar of Soochow University.

摘　　要：Low-carbon regulation and market competition present new opportunities and challenges for supply chain firms,emphasizing the significance of carbon reduction and channel encroachment in enhancing competitiveness.This study formulates various game models to evaluate manufacturers’encroachment strategies(with or without encroachment)under different conditions of low-carbon investment by retailers.It investigates the operational decisions and carbon abatement strategies of firms under various scenarios.The findings reveal that encroachment elevates unit abatement levels but decreases wholesale prices and retailer profits when unit encroachment costs are below certain thresholds.In contrast,the manufacturer consistently benefits from channel encroachment.Retailer-initiated low-carbon investments can motivate manufacturers to reduce emissions.A lower carbon price potentially offers financial advantages to retailer engaging in such investments.Additionally,the likelihood of reduced environmental damage postchannel encroachment,compared to preprofessional encroachment,increases when the retailer invests in low-carbon initiatives.The retailer’s profit is inversely related to the carbon price,and a higher carbon price can strengthen the incentive effect of low-carbon investment on the manufacturer’s abatement endeavors.

关 键 词：carbon cap-and-trade channel encroachment emission reduction low-carbon investment 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]